SOVEREIGNTY FOR SURVIVAL

AMERICAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION

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Yale UNIVERSITY PRESS
New Haven and London
Introduction

IN THE SPRING of 1973, in the heart of the same Powder River Country of Montana where George Armstrong Custer met his death a century earlier, a modern-day Indian revolution erupted. Much like the nineteenth-century conflict sparked by white prospectors seeking gold in the sacred Black Hills of Dakota, the twentieth-century version featured an impassioned revolt against the incessant intrusions of non-Indians hoping to extract precious minerals. Also as in the earlier conflict, Indian resistance was fueled by fear that losing control over an indigenous land base would produce the end of the People, erasing the unique social customs and cultural values that distinguished their group from others. Survival once again hung in the balance. And as in the earlier conflict, this revolt would fundamentally alter the relationship between the federal government and Native American tribes.

There were, of course, important differences. For one, rather than seeking yellow gold in the Black Hills, white prospectors during the 1970s desired the “black gold” of the Yellowstone Country known as low-sulfur, subbituminous coal. Changing patterns in world energy production and domestic consumption following World War II had combined with new environmental legislation during the early 1970s to transform this once overlooked energy source into a highly valuable commodity. And vast quantities of this desirable resource happened
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to lie tantalizingly close to the surface of the Northern Cheyenne and Crow Reservations in southeastern Montana. To access this coal, non-Indians once again worked through and with the federal government. But rather than employing military force, as was done during the nineteenth century, multinational companies exploited a broken and outdated legal regime that sought to promote the development of western resources at the expense of tribal sovereignty, ecological health, and simple equity.

Although the tactics differed, the initial results of this late twentieth-century grab for Indian resources were comparable to nineteenth-century efforts. By 1973, energy firms had gained control of hundreds of thousands of acres of Indian land and millions more were threatened. On the Northern Cheyenne and Crow Reservations alone, the combined acreage opened for mining exceeded 600,000 acres, allowing energy companies to prospect over half the Northern Cheyenne’s total land mass. It is no surprise, then, that Indian leaders such as the Northern Cheyenne’s John Woodenlegs drew parallels to their tribes’ nineteenth-century battles. As Woodenlegs explained, “Our Cheyenne people fought hard to be allowed to live in Montana. Our whole history has been a struggle for survival. The impact of uncontrolled coal development could finish us off.”

But unlike the tragic, if also heroic, nineteenth-century battles that relegated Northern Plains tribes to small parcels of their once vast homelands, circumscribing their control over daily activities and all but eliminating the tribes’ political sovereignty, the postwar contest ultimately expanded tribal powers. It left Indians better positioned to capitalize on their abundant natural resources, if they chose to do so. This story, then, is not another romantic account celebrating valiant but largely unsuccessful fights for freedom on the Northern Plains. It is, instead, a powerful tale of tribes becoming skilled negotiators, sophisticated energy developers, expert land managers, and more effective governing bodies. In this story, Indians worked meticulously to increase their understanding of the complicated legal, political, and economic mechanisms governing their lands and created a sovereign space where tribes decide the fate of their resources. These tribal governments asserted control over reservation resources to ensure their communities’ survival. And the story begins in the same remote corner of south-
eastern Montana where a century earlier the Northern Cheyenne and Sioux dealt the United States military its most crushing Indian defeat.

At its most essential, what happened on the Northern Plains in the 1970s was that energy tribes—those American Indian groups possessing substantial energy resources—expanded their governments’ capacity to manage reservation land, and as a result, there came a belated recognition of the tribes’ legal authority to govern communal resources. Indian people seized the skills necessary to protect their sovereignty because sovereignty was crucial to protecting tribal lifeways and land. To accomplish this, energy tribes had to first dismantle a century-old legal regime built on the premise of inherent tribal sovereignty but corrupted with an ideology of Indian inferiority. As far back as the 1830s, the Supreme Court had articulated a seemingly expansive view of tribal sovereignty that should have afforded Indian groups control over their own affairs. In *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832), for instance, Chief Justice John Marshall explained, “The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.” President Andrew Jackson’s infamous retort, however, that “the decision of the Supreme Court has fell still born” set the tone for how local, state, and federal authorities would respect this and other early holdings favorable to Indian rights. With few exceptions, nineteenth-century government officials and non-state actors ignored federal case law, enacted statutes overriding judicial decisions, or re-interpreted Marshall’s opinions to eviscerate their holdings. Whites desired Indian land and resources, and they’d be damned if an impotent federal judiciary would stop them.  

To justify this taking of indigenous lands, nineteenth-century Americans constructed complicated and evolving ideas about Indians’ inferior capacity to manage their own affairs. Early, ambivalent views of Native Americans as either noble savages or ignoble beasts rendered eastern tribes beyond the pale of Euro-American civilization, supporting an Indian removal policy thinly veiled as a humanitarian mission to protect unprepared Indians from encroaching American settlers. These efforts to separate a supposedly inferior people gradually gave way by midcentury to more benevolent, if misguided, assimilation policies designed to indoctrinate Indians with the civilizing values of settled
agriculture and Protestantism. By the end of the century, however, the
dominant conception had changed once again, as pseudo-scientific ra-
cial theories emerged to challenge the efficacy of this cultural uplift
program, claiming race permanently relegated Indians to the periphery
of American society. Discouraged by the persistence of Indian culture,
eastern policy makers gladly handed over responsibility for “the Indian
problem” to western politicians, who employed more “realistic” views
of Indians’ inability to evolve in order to justify an imperial land policy.
Recast as people doomed by their race, Indians now became “assimi-
lated” through industrial education, federal wardship, partial citizen-
ship, and the loss of more land and resources.³

The “Indian New Deal” of the 1930s supposedly changed all this.
Orchestrated by the social crusader John Collier, whom Franklin Roo-
sevelt appointed commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933, the federal
government set about reversing its Indian policy of the past 150 years.
Collier ended the disastrous program of allotting tribal lands to indi-
vidual Indians—which had also opened “surplus” areas to white set-
tlers—and sought to empower tribal governments to protect commu-
nal holdings. As we will see, however, Collier himself was not immune
to paternalistic assumptions of Indian inferiority. The scion of a promi-
nent southern family, Collier turned from his capitalist roots to fi-
ght for the preservation of Indian culture because he believed it offered vi-
tal lessons in communal living to a spiritually bankrupt, individualistic
America. Still, Collier’s Progressive faith often overrode his benevolent
intentions. Under his tenure, the Office of Indian Affairs constructed a
legal regime that gave tribal governments some tools to protect their
land base yet also ensured that decisions over how to manage reserva-
tion assets remained largely in the hands of federal experts.⁴

Nowhere was this Progressive, paternalistic impulse more evident
than in the laws governing Indian minerals. Prior to the 1930s, a
hodgepodge of narrow and often conflicting statutes left the develop-
ment of these resources in disarray. Collier and his colleagues within
the Department of the Interior sought to provide a uniform system for
Indian mineral development, but they differed in approaches. In par-
ticular, a young assistant solicitor named Felix Cohen resurrected John
Marshall’s early nineteenth-century opinions on inherent tribal sover-
eignty to advocate for tribal governments making their own develop-
ment decisions, free of federal influence. For Collier, however, the risk
of allowing unprepared tribal leaders to develop reservation resources by engaging in the cutthroat world of industrial capitalism proved too much. Instead, the Office of Indian Affairs adopted an approach used for public minerals: federal officials would survey reservation lands, judiciously select tracts for development, and then require competitive bidding to determine which mining companies could prospect and lease Indian minerals. Tribes had to consent to the extraction of their minerals, but federal law gave them no specific authority to develop these resources themselves. The regime fit Collier’s twin goals perfectly. Federal officials would help tribes develop reservation economies to support their communities, and in doing so they would insulate indigenous lifeways from capitalism’s divisive influence.

It was within this legal context that most tribes first encountered multinational energy companies seeking to extract reservation minerals to feed America’s post–World War II energy demands. Driven by stubborn ideologies that cast doubt upon Indian capacity for managing tribal resources, statutory law failed to provide explicit authority for tribes to develop their own resources. Instead, Native Americans were forced to rely on their federal trustees, who had been tasked with surveying reservation land and selecting appropriate tracts for development. These officials, however, were completely unequipped to do so. The results were predictable. Energy firms, not federal agents, surveyed Indian reservations, proposed which areas to open for development, and then secured permits to prospect and mine. They also accomplished this under a veil of secrecy, careful not to attract competition from other developers that would drive up the price of Indian minerals. By 1973, energy companies had opened millions of acres of Indian land to prospecting and mining, yet tribal governments had collected miniscule payments for this privilege.

That is, until the Northern Cheyenne took action to ensure the survival of the tribe. Located at the epicenter of a booming new trade in western, low-sulfur coal, Cheyenne tribal members saw the grandiose scale of mining proposed for their reservation and envisioned hordes of non-Indian coal miners descending on their lands, disrupting the social customs and cultural norms that sustained their unique indigenous community. Many Cheyenne lamented the potential environmental impacts of massive strip mines, but far more feared becoming minorities on their own reservation. Tribal members of all stripes thus mobilized
to fight for what they believed to be their tribe’s survival, organizing a grassroots campaign to protest potential mining that prompted tribal leaders to take legal actions to protect the reservation. Here, the tide of energy companies exploiting Indian minerals turned.

What follows is a “movement history” that explains how this small group of American Indians organized to halt a specific mining project they viewed as a threat to their indigenous community and then mobilized similarly situated energy tribes into a national coalition to educate tribal leaders and demand changes to federal law. The tale begins in Lame Deer, Montana, but travels quickly to the adjacent Crow Reservation, then to reservations and courtrooms across the West, corporate boardrooms in the East, federal agency headquarters in Washington, D.C., and ultimately, the United States Congress. The Northern Cheyenne and the Crow tribes are featured prominently, but this is not a tribal history. These two groups were the first to successfully challenge reservation energy projects, thus a tribal-level investigation is warranted into the reasons why these communities, and not others, were able to halt mining until their governments controlled reservation resources. Such an analysis is provided, as is an explanation of how heated intratribal fights over mining wrought important changes within the Northern Cheyenne and Crow communities. But what happened after these tribes asserted control over reservation mining had a far greater impact on tribal sovereignty nationwide. The explanation for that sea change in federal Indian law is the true burden of this book. By organizing disparate energy tribes into a national coalition focused on increasing tribal capacity to govern reservation land, the efforts begun in southeast Montana ultimately delivered a new legal regime—anchored by the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act—that recognized tribal, not federal, control over reservation development.

Scholars of Native America should have little trouble fitting this remarkable tale into the broader trajectory of federal Indian policy at the close of the twentieth century. After all, the 1970s began with President Richard Nixon publicly rebuking the existing Indian policy of “Termination,” which sought to end the government’s special trust relationship with Indian tribes, and proclaiming “a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions” rather than federal agencies. Labeling this new policy “Indian Self-Determination,” the president affirmed his goal was not to assimilate Indian people into
the larger American mass, but to empower tribal governments so that they may “strengthen the Indian’s sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.” The move fit clearly within Nixon’s burgeoning New Federalism philosophy to transfer responsibility and power for social welfare from federal to local governments. With respect to Native Americans, Nixon also sought to end what many viewed as an unhealthy dependence on the federal government. For American Indians who had been clamoring for more control over their lives and land since the reservation system began in the mid-nineteenth century, the message could hardly have been more welcomed. These people had never stopped working to determine their own fate, but now the president provided rhetorical cover for their actions. A policy window to effectuate real change had opened.

Yet despite the lavish attention paid to Nixon’s message by both contemporary observers and historians, the self-determination policy was not self-executing. There was no sudden transfer to tribal governments of authority and responsibility over reservation land, people, and programs. Simply put, no white man could grant Indian sovereignty; tribal governments themselves would have to fill in the contours of the self-determination policy. Even Nixon’s legislative proposals to hand over federally funded programs required tribal governments to first request such authority and demonstrate their capacity to run these programs effectively. Many tribes seized this opportunity to take over programs related to reservation housing and education, as authorized by the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and Education Act, but Indians also pursued self-determination through other measures not anticipated by federal policy makers, most famously Indian gaming.

In pursuing these paths to power, then, tribal actors worked within the political and legal structure crafted by non-Indians, but they also took extralegal actions to shape that structure to address the issues most important to them. And no issue was more important than control over reservation land and resources. Yet there are no histories explaining how tribes reclaimed authority over these items. This book tackles this crucial, and as yet unexplained, transition, demonstrating how energy tribes worked beyond the existing legal structure to transform the promise of sovereignty contained in the self-determination policy into actual control over reservation development. In doing so, tribes greatly enlarged a third area of sovereignty within the federal system where
tribal, not federal or state, governments now hold primary authority over reservation land and resources.\textsuperscript{8}

There are also important lessons here that transcend interests in American Indian history and policy, and none is more important than demonstrating how control over energy confers power. To state as much sounds axiomatic, but this book reveals the complicated, underlying material and social forces that make such a statement appear self-evident. On the material side, we know that energy underlies power. Physicists have long told us that energy is the life force of all activity, that it exists in all matter, and every organism uses energy, mostly derived from the sun, to accomplish tasks. Energy is the capacity to do work. In converting energy into useful motion, scientists describe organisms as exhibiting power. Power is thus energy put to work, and all beings exercise some form of it. Of course, one of the greatest conversions of energy into power has come with the ability to burn fossil fuels to produce electrical and mechanical power.\textsuperscript{9}

But energy also produces power in the social realm. Older sociological conceptions of power, dating back to Max Weber, defined the term as a function of social position or status. More recently, sociologists of science and technology, environmental historians, and historians of technology have come to recognize that “social power” has a material, energetic basis as well. The ability of humans to effectuate their desires, often by shaping the actions of others, derives not from their position in society but is produced through their increasing ability to control material inputs, mostly by exhibiting mastery over social structures governing those inputs. As Bruno Latour explains, “This shift from principle to practice allows us to treat the vague notion of power not as a cause of people’s behavior but as the consequence of an intense activity of enrolling, convincing, and enlisting.” Power, in other words, is not the result of status and does not explain how people achieve their ends. Instead, it is created through the process of acquiring capacity to control matter—and thus energy—and must itself be explained.\textsuperscript{10}

Throughout the 1970s, American Indians increased their capacity to control energy and thus grew more powerful. They secured energy experts to review potential mining projects, educated tribal leaders so they could negotiate better mineral contracts, and passed tribal ordinances to shape how energy resources would be extracted. They improved their mastery over those social structures governing access to
energy. Ultimately, as we will see, this increased capacity produced changes in federal law that recognized tribes’ legal authority over reservation resources. Again, increasing capacity to control energy expanded tribal power within the federal structure. Lawyers call such power “sovereignty.”

Precisely because control over energy produces power, this book also demonstrates the far-reaching impacts of local conflicts over natural resources. Environmental historians, in particular, have spent years explaining how the pursuit of valuable resources structures relations between developed cores and distant peripheries. The incorporation of outlying commodities into global markets, we are told, renders faraway places dependent on urban regions, while producing untold environmental destruction and social dislocation at the point of extraction. Influenced by anthropologists, the best of these studies complicate the story by recognizing how local actors shape the implementation of seemingly “universal” forces like global capitalism or the high modernist ideology of nation building. Instead of an easy, top-down application of these forces to extract resources, peripheral elites, peasants, wage workers, indigenous communities and their laws, customs, and norms all influence development. In the creative space where universals and local influence meet—what Anna Tsing calls “friction”—resources often get extracted, but on compromised terms. ¹¹

These nuanced investigations into global resource development, however, still tend not to follow the trajectory of impacts outward, from local to regional, national, or global implications. Environmental and social effects are felt in the periphery, and perhaps local actors influence the method of extraction, but their actions rarely alter the larger structures shaping development. This book demonstrates the opposite, that local efforts to control how development unfolds in particular places produces power at the periphery, which can radiate beyond those locales. Certainly, changes in the global energy industry and antiquated federal laws created pressures to develop energy minerals on Native American reservations, where energy firms were forced to negotiate with increasingly knowledgeable tribal leaders to get deals done. But local concerns over tribal survival not only informed the types of development Indians would allow, they also shaped the overriding economic and legal structures that first brought energy firms to their reservations. To ensure survival, energy tribes increased their
control over tribal resources and authorized only mining projects in
which their governments could control the pace and scale. This then
affected regional development schemes from the American Southwest
to the Northern Plains. But when federal law seemed to prohibit even
this type of tribal control over reservation mining, energy tribes set out
to change the national legal structure governing their resources. Ulti-
mately, the tribes succeeded in securing new legislation granting tribal
authority over reservation minerals, and in doing so they encoded local
concerns over tribal survival into federal laws governing energy de-
velopment nationwide. The local emanated outward to shape regional
mining projects, national laws, and global energy flows.12

The final lesson drawn from this book involves the intimate connec-
tions between a group’s physical and social landscape, its approach
to governance, and how the community defines itself. Arthur McEvoy
stresses the mutability of a society’s legal and political structures, ex-
plaining how they “evolv[e] in response to their social and natural en-
vironments even as they mediate the interaction between the two.” For
McEvoy, the manner in which a group decides how to govern itself
reflects cultural choices made over the best method for mediating so-
cial relations and managing the surrounding nonhuman environment.
Groups value certain behavior between their members and toward their
land and thus establish political institutions and pass laws to achieve
those desired results. But these social structures are not all-controlling.
Physical and social environments change due to external or internal
forces, and when they do, the people often change their governments
to better align with the altered conditions. Laws and political institu-
tions are simply culture manifested, with roots in both the physical and
social environment.13

To McEvoy’s apt description of the basis of governance, I would
add that once group members establish their governing principles and
procedures, they then partly define their community based on these
decisions. They might say, for example, “We are Crow, thus we man-
age the environment this way”; or, “As Northern Cheyenne, we believe
this is the best manner to police ourselves.” Changing governing struc-
tures, such as ratifying new constitutions or placing power over natural
resources in new government bodies, is thus an incredibly disruptive
event for the community because it fundamentally alters how the group
has previously defined itself. Some members may support the move as
a reasonable extension of the community’s belief system, but for others the change is a threat to the group identity they subscribe to. These members ask the fair question: “Are we still Crow if we no longer govern ourselves and our resources the way the Crow used to?”

For many American Indian communities wrestling with the prospect of reservation energy development, these contentious internal struggles over natural resource governance and identity left the most lasting legacies. Groups like the Crow and Navajo altered their governments to take advantage of development opportunities and better control mining’s impacts, but these changes deeply divided their communities. These divisions, in turn, often made it difficult to form the consensus necessary to capitalize on their abundant resources. Tribal factionalism is, of course, nothing new, and scholars have sometimes explained these conflicts in terms of internal groups vying for control over valuable resources. But few studies explain the ferocity of these debates in terms of changes to the legal structures governing natural resources. Under the auspices of “modernizing” or improving the “efficiency” of their tribal governments, energy tribes altered their governments and increased their capacity to manage reservation land. For some, however, these changes signified much more than improvements to governance. They represented a revaluing of an essential component of tribal culture (how the group manages its environment) and thus a redefining of tribal identity. Governance, the environment, and culture were inextricably entwined. As the cultural geographer Don Mitchell explains, “Moments of intense political and economic restructuring . . . are also moments of intense cultural restructuring.”

The remarkable tale of Indian agency that follows, then, not only explains how energy tribes reconfigured the legal relationship between tribal and federal governments, it also demonstrates how this process wrought fundamental changes within tribal communities. Considering the intimate relationships between the environment, law, and culture, how could it be any other way?
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THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
BY THE SUMMER of 1974, the view from southeastern Montana was improving. Responding to perceived attacks on the homeland, both the Northern Cheyenne and Crow had taken control of reservation mining and were exploring options to develop their resources in ways that ensured their communities’ survival. The Northern Cheyenne’s successful petition to the Department of the Interior had halted reservation mining and put the tribe in a position to extract the coal itself. The community was unified and prepared to reverse American Indians’ historical role as passive observers to the development of their own resources. Next door, the Crow would soon fracture over the issue of reservation mining, but in summer 1974, the tribe’s newly elected chairman, Patrick Stands Over Bull, had established a reservation mining moratorium and was focused on developing only the Ceded Strip. All Crow agreed that tribal control over energy projects was necessary to mitigate harmful social, cultural, and environmental impacts. Benefiting from difficult lessons learned elsewhere, both tribes stood ready to reap economic benefits from development pursued only on tribal terms.

Yet as important as these actions were for the Crow and Northern Cheyenne communities, those involved in these battles recognized that the war over Indian energy could not be won solely in southeastern Montana. Events beyond regional and national boundaries ensured
continual pressures to develop reservation resources across the West, pressures that could be met only with a similarly broad campaign to equip tribal leaders with the tools and knowledge needed to control development. Thus, in the months following President Nixon’s November 1973 announcement of Project Independence—an ambitious response to OPEC’s October oil embargo that called for expanding domestic production to make the country “energy independent” by the end of the decade—tribal leaders made several attempts to mobilize a consortium of similarly situated tribes to share experiences, consultants, and funding to prepare for the coming onslaught in energy demand. If the country wanted Indian resources, energy tribes could facilitate the process, but they had their own set of demands. These groups organized to ensure their communities received the bulk of benefits from reservation development.

STANDING GROUND: “A DECLARATION OF INDIAN RIGHTS”

Ironically, the federal government planted the seeds for the first pantribal association to defend Indian energy rights. On October 3, 1972, Interior Secretary Rogers Morton announced a joint, interagency, federal-state task force “to assess the potential social, economic and environmental impacts which would result from future development of the vast coal deposits and other resources in the five Northern Great Plains States.” Involving a dozen federal agencies and a handful of states, the Northern Great Plains Resource Program (NGPRP) followed two previous attempts in the decade to coordinate energy development in the region. Like its predecessors, which included the ill-fated North Central Power Study, the NGPRP explored the possibility of a massive, interjurisdictional, region-wide development scheme to transform the thinly populated Northern Plains into an “energy belt” to meet the nation’s growing needs. But unlike the previous studies, which focused solely on maximizing the rate of production for valuable resources, the Department of the Interior intended the NGPRP to take a more holistic approach. Multiple scenarios for regional development would be studied, and potential impacts assessed across a wide range of economic, social, and environmental values. In fact, in explaining the NGPRP as “an outgrowth of public concern in the region [over] prior
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...studies of the region’s resources by Federal and State governments as well as private organizations,” Secretary Morton left little doubt that his agency had heard the complaints of Northern Plains’ ranchers and environmentalists who feared energy development would disrupt their livelihoods and landscapes. Responding to these concerns, the secretary promised a more thoughtful approach to regional development.  

The same attention, however, was not paid to the region’s first occupants, as once again, no one had bothered to solicit Native American input for the proposed plans. Anxious tribes could only watch as the Interior secretary promised other constituencies a more calculated approach to Northern Plains’ development while declaring confidently that “these major coal deposits will be developed, that is inevitable, but how they are developed is of national interest.” Excluded from the process, Indians felt their apprehension over the potential use of tribal resources increase as President Nixon delivered a series of unprecedented addresses in 1973 that stressed the need to expand domestic energy production, particularly from the nation’s vast coal reserves. Never before had a president featured energy policy in a message to Congress or the American people. Now, even before the October 1973 Arab oil embargo, Nixon was highlighting the disparity between the amount of coal the country possessed—according to him, over half the world’s reserves—and the amount being used to meet domestic energy needs—again by the president’s estimate, less than 20 percent. To remedy this disparity, in his April 1973 address the president urged “that highest national priority be given to expanded development and utilization of our coal resources,” including those along the Northern Plains. When Nixon again emphasized these vast untapped coal reserves in his November 7 announcement of Project Independence, the message from the top was clear. Energy development was coming to the Northern Plains and the federal government was paving the way.  

The nation’s newfound commitment to Northern Plains coal development was on a collision course with indigenous peoples’ commitment to community survival. Sensing tribal resources would again be sacrificed for the good of the country, Indian leaders reacted to Nixon’s call for energy independence by organizing a historic gathering of Northern Plains tribes for December 18, 1973, on North Dakota’s Fort Berthold Reservation. The one hundred plus delegates who arrived at the reservation shared by the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara tribes
planned initially to discuss the NGPRP’s impact to tribal water rights. The conversation broadened quickly, however, to include a general denunciation of the regional development program and a plan for a coordinated defense. Unable to ignore a gathering of this many disgruntled stakeholders, especially those with precious water and mineral rights, NGPRP Director John Vanderwalker scrambled to attend the meeting and placate Indian concerns. He did not receive the reception he had hoped for. Instead, the gathered tribal leaders made clear their strong resolve to oppose regional development without Native input, leaving the director with little choice but to bring the tribes into the NGPRP process. Yet Vanderwalker’s view of the tribes’ appropriate role was telling of the government’s notion of tribal sovereignty, even under the new self-determination policy. Labeling these groups as special “consultants,” the NGPRP director invited the tribes merely to submit formal comments on the final report. Apparently, the insensitivity of belatedly asking American Indians to “consult” on a plan that would deeply impact their resources and communities was lost on Vanderwalker.¹

The insult was not missed by tribal delegates. Those in attendance seized the opportunity to submit comments on the NGPRP as a chance to organize collectively and articulate broader concerns regarding the expropriation of Indian resources. Before disbanding at Fort Berthold, delegates established a temporary committee to draft their comments and enlisted the assistance of Native American Rights Fund (NARF) attorney Thomas Fredericks, himself a Mandan tribal member. At the time, NARF attorneys were already busy on the nearby Northern Cheyenne and Crow Reservations restructuring or canceling existing mining projects. This experience, combined with NARF’s earlier work on behalf of Hopi and Navajo tribal members, positioned Fredericks’s relatively small public-interest law firm as the nation’s foremost expert on protecting Indian mineral rights. It also allowed NARF attorneys to develop a common legal strategy that entailed first asserting tribal control over natural resources—and defending this claim in legal or administrative actions, if necessary—before entertaining proposals to develop them. Fredericks shared this message with his new clients, several of whom, like committee member and Northern Cheyenne President Allen Rowland, were already fighting their own tribal battles to control reservation mining. Under Fredericks’s guidance and with Rowland’s support, the temporary committee’s task to provide specific comments
on the NGPRP morphed into a general defense of indigenous rights over all Northern Plains resources guaranteed by past treaties.\(^4\)

As the broader scope of this undertaking became clear, those involved understood that a simple declaration of rights was not sufficient to defend legal claims to highly valuable resources. A formal organization was required to carry the fight. Thus when the Northern Plains tribes gathered again in Billings, Montana, on January 17, 1974, to review their draft statement on Indian resources, delegates formed another ad hoc committee to not only finalize the statement but also draft a constitution and bylaws for a new federation to protect tribal rights. None other than Northern Cheyenne Tribal President Allen Rowland chaired this new committee. Working throughout the winter, Rowland and his fellow delegates returned to Billings in March to approve what was now titled the “Declaration of Indian Rights to the Natural Resources in the Northern Great Plains” and finalize founding documents for the Native American Natural Resources Development Federation (NANRDF). By May, the new organization had elected former and future Rosebud Sioux Tribal President Robert Burnette as its chairman. In addition to his tribal duties, Burnette also was the former executive director of the National Congress of American Indians and the visionary behind the Trail of Broken Treaties. Clearly, he possessed the leadership qualities and experience necessary to make NANRDF a force to be reckoned with on the Northern Plains. Within a few short months, the indigenous outrage at being excluded from the NGPRP process had blossomed into a full, pan-tribal alliance to protect tribal resources and communities.\(^5\)

Much like the Northern Cheyenne and Crow revolts, organizers of this pan-tribal alliance understood their mission as a desperate defense of tribal homelands, and the Native American Rights Fund made sure to make this point in terms all Americans could understand. Dedicating its spring 1975 newsletter to the formation of NANRDF, NARF staff drew explicit comparisons between the saga unfolding on the Northern Plains and the American Revolution. The Northern Cheyenne and Crow, NARF explained, were the Sons of Liberty that ignited the insurrection. The Billings meetings played as a modern-day Second Continental Congress, producing a Native Declaration of Independence and a confederation to manage the anticolonial war. And just as the complaints of the Boston patriots had found their fullest expression in the
exalted prose of the Founding Fathers, the arguments first articulated by the Northern Cheyenne and Crow were now being expounded upon by the twenty-six founding members of NANRDF. Their Declaration of Indian Rights explained how the international energy crisis “makes the vast coal resources of [the Northern Plains] very appealing for immediate development,” and that such pressure to develop “threatens the viability of our environment and the continued existence of the 26 tribes which occupy the Northern Great Plains.” Defiant in its defense of these communities, NANRDF put the world on notice that its members intended to “maintain their ownership to the priceless natural resources which are geographically and legally related to their reservations” and warned federal agencies that any attempt to divert or use tribal resources “shall be at their own risk.” The line in the sand had been drawn.⁶

To defend its position, NANRDF set out not only to represent its members’ interests in federal and state planning efforts but also to construct an indigenous network of knowledge to help tribal leaders make sound resource development decisions. In fact, of NANRDF’s four founding purposes—(1) to coordinate efforts to describe and quantify Northern Plains Indians’ cultural and natural resources, (2) to develop scientific data and expertise to make informed management decisions for these resources, (3) to represent affected Indians in federal and state planning programs, and (4) to provide assistance to individual tribes in managing their resources—three were dedicated to generating and sharing information on appropriate resource management techniques. This focus on gathering knowledge about minerals and markets and educating tribal leaders on the nuances of energy development mirrored the approach taken by the Crow and Northern Cheyenne. The affinity was no accident. The very same leaders and advisors involved in those struggles were applying similar tactics in this concomitant effort to build a pan-tribal alliance.⁷

ON THE OFFENSIVE: CREATING THE COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES

By the summer of 1974, the revolution launched in Lame Deer had gained solid footing in tribal communities across the Northern Plains. The government’s latest coordinated efforts to tap regional energy re-
serves triggered indigenous resistance among numerous potentially affected communities. Conditioned by the Cheyenne, Crow, and southwestern experiences, the Northern Plains groups issued a declaration of rights drawing attention to the government’s latest exploits and formed a pan-tribal organization to combat them. NANRDF was the first entity of its kind, uniting dozens of tribes behind the single purpose of protecting valuable tribal minerals.

But for all of its importance, the Northern Plains’ coalition was still regional in scope and defensive in nature. It was an appropriate response, for it reflected the particular threat posed. The Department of the Interior’s actions to exploit Northern Plains’ resources represented an older, Progressive-era approach to western development, one where the government directed resource management and reflexively ignored tribal input. In the 1970s, however, new federal agencies were exploring innovative partnerships with groups outside the federal bureaucracy that could increase domestic energy production nationwide. If Interior’s actions on the Northern Plains called for a defensive response, this novel approach provided common ground for energy tribes and federal officials to work together. It also provided a platform to expand the Northern Plains alliance into a national consortium to represent the interests of all energy tribes. Tribal leaders formed NANRDF to fight Department of the Interior actions in the North, but they would establish the Council of Energy Resource Tribes (CERT) in partnership with new federal efforts to cooperatively expand domestic energy production.

A familiar warrior triggered the search for common ground between energy tribes and the federal government. On February 13, 1974, George Crossland, the Osage attorney who had first counseled the Northern Cheyenne to tear up their coal leases, wrote to Stuart Jamieson of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) advocating for a “tribal energy coalition” to help tribes maximize the long-range benefits of their energy resources. Crossland was not involved in NANRDF’s creation, but he understood what Project Independence meant for Native resources. He warned Jamieson that the country’s excessive growth would continue to place extreme pressures on these resources and argued that tribes needed a common strategy to protect their minerals or else “we shall see the experiences of the Osages and Navajos-Hopis repeated: the depletion and consumption of the
resources base.” Following up a month later, Crossland submitted a more extensive memo to NCAI Executive Director Chuck Trimble that included data on the nation’s increasing energy use and quotes from its top energy policy makers. According to the longtime tribal rights advocate, these indicators “lead inevitably to the conclusion that the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of the Interior are quite willing to sacrifice Indian people, in the first instance, for the gain of the energy industry.” “Therefore, if the ‘past is prologue,’” Crossland continued, “the tribes must be more informed than ever before if they determine to utilize their natural resources. In the headlong rush to meet the nation’s energy demands, it is entirely conceivable that the loss of tribal viability will be considered just one of the nation’s ‘social costs.’” One of the nation’s foremost experts in defending tribal resource rights was raising the alarm to the country’s largest Indian rights group and asking the NCAI to organize its members for a mutual defense.8

As it turns out, Crossland’s plea fit perfectly with an important policy shift occurring within the NCAI to empower tribes to develop their own, Indian-led reservation economies rather than relying on outside capital to build non-Indian enterprises on the reservations. Founded in 1944 to fight federal efforts to terminate the special trustee relationship between tribes and the federal government, the NCAI had consistently worked “within the system” to protect tribal treaty rights and enhance indigenous communities. During the 1960s, this approach meant largely eschewing the combative tactics of more militant groups, such as the National Indian Youth Council or the American Indian Movement, to focus on extending President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs to impoverished American Indians. To stimulate reservation economies, the NCAI thus obtained status as a national Community Action Agency and administered an Indian Economic Development Program designed to bring industrial activity to rural reservations. As the NCAI explained in a proposal to the Economic Development Administration, this approach involved “a series of ‘industrial show-type’ seminars wherein Indian Tribes would set up booths extolling the benefits of locating industry on their respective reservations . . . and booths were [also] provided for industries to display their products for consideration by the Tribes.” To develop reservation economies, the NCAI acted essentially as a national Chamber of Commerce seeking to site private industries on Indian reservations.9
By the early 1970s, however, the organization was reexamining this model. Member tribes were rejecting the “industrial show” approach due largely, as the NCAI noted, to the “growing nationalistic emphasis of the Tribes on the development of Tribal government and development of their natural resources.” Proposing a shift in tactics to the Economic Development Administration in 1974, the NCAI explained that in this “year of national introspection” caused by the Arab oil embargo, tribes “are engaged in widespread governmental and economic development, and are beginning to look increasingly to the development of their [own] human and natural resources.” To lead this transition to Indian-centered reservation economies, the NCAI proposed a series of intensive, multiday seminars that would educate tribal leaders on the specific industries most appropriate for their reservations. These included commercial fishing seminars for Pacific Northwest tribes and agribusiness primers for those in the Great Plains, but the NCAI argued that “potentially the most important seminar on the proposed schedule” was a panel on energy resources intended for the “Indian ‘Energy Belt’ extending from western North Dakota diagonally southwestward through Arizona.” In this time of soaring energy demands and limited international oil supplies, the NCAI looked to Indian energy development as the potential flagship for its new approach to reservation economies.10

And, of course, who knew more about the intricacies of the Indian energy industry than the tribes and consultants currently fighting to control their minerals? NCAI staffers thus reached out to the Northern Cheyenne, Crow, and other Northern Plains tribes to help organize the first ever “Indian energy conference” for late summer 1974. Dan Israel and Thomas Fredericks—NARF attorneys who represented the Crow and NANRDF, respectively—responded with a series of memos to conference organizer Stuart Jamieson, sharing their extensive experience with Indian energy development and outlining everything from general topics to be addressed to specific panel structures and suggested participants. Unsurprisingly, the issues topping NARF’s discussion points reflected their experience on the Northern Plains, including developing tribal capacity to control reservation resources, educating tribal leaders on how to negotiate contracts that retained tribal ownership over mining ventures, and discussing the role of the recently formed NANRDF. When the NCAI announced details of the August 1974
energy conference in its national newsletter, the proposed agenda mirrored the format and topics suggested by the NARF attorneys. And if the influence of the Northern Plains energy tribes was not clear enough, the conference was scheduled to take place in Billings and would be cohosted by Northern Cheyenne President Allen Rowland and Crow Chairman Patrick Stands Over Bull.\(^{11}\)

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The NCAI-sponsored Indian Energy Conference marked an important transition in the movement for tribal control over reservation resources. Coming together for several days of debate and discussion, tribal leaders began to reconceive their mission as not only defending reservation resources against perceived threats to tribal survival but also proactively using these assets to expand tribal sovereignty and reservation economies. Of course, both the defensive and proactive strategies were needed to replace non-Indian mining with tribal-led ventures, and both views were represented at this conference. Allen Rowland, for instance, opened the meeting by deriding the federal government’s failure to uphold its trustee duty and explaining that NANRDF had been formed specifically to fight federally led development. “Where’s our trustees?” Rowland asked the audience rhetorically, “Well by God, that’s a damned good question. I’ve been looking around for them for a hell of a long time now, about 15 years. And every place I go, I find them working against us. . . . [S]o what’s got to happen, the way I look at it, is the Indian people got to band together to save what we have left.” Rowland was not alone in his continued calls for a mutual defense. Suggesting specific tactics to strengthen tribal resistance, Crow activist Dale Kindness warned that coal development would spell the end of many indigenous communities unless tribes established reservation zoning ordinances and environmental codes to shape planned mining. Kindness pleaded, “If we are to continue as Indian people with our own values, society and culture, we have to stand up straight and get our stuff together.” Clearly, the experience of the Crow and Northern Cheyenne as the test subjects for Northern Plains’ energy development had produced powerful sentiments against non-Indian mining.\(^{12}\)

But the other message offered at this unprecedented gathering moved beyond defensive posturing and suggested an innovative approach to capitalize on the tribes’ vast resources. Interestingly, this view was artic-
ulated most clearly by an outsider, Arjun Makhijani, who was a project specialist at the Ford Foundation’s Energy Policy Project. Since 1971, the Ford Foundation had been committing its substantial resources to resolving what it saw as an unsustainable rate of American energy consumption. As part of this effort, Makhijani worked with a group of distinguished economists, scientists, engineers, and policy experts to explore the range of available energy choices and to suggest new policies for responsible energy use. Completing its final report, entitled *A Time to Choose*, earlier in 1974, this team recommended a “conservation oriented energy policy” to reduce America’s energy demand, which would address the associated problems of energy shortages, environmental and social concerns arising out of increased domestic production, and the growing power of Middle Eastern oil exporters. At the end of their three-year study, the Ford Foundation group represented perhaps the country’s foremost gathering of energy experts. They had the knowledge energy tribes lacked.\(^{13}\)

Recognizing the need for expert assistance, the NCAI had approached the Ford Foundation for help on its Indian Energy Conference. Directed to Makhijani, NCAI Director Chuck Trimble met with the energy expert and explained the tribes’ predicament. “We’re ground zero on this,” Trimble acknowledged. “We don’t know what we have, and therefore we don’t know where we’re going, and that’s what this conference is about.” Makhijani responded by admitting he knew very little about American Indians, but he nevertheless accepted Trimble’s invitation to apply his vast knowledge of the global energy industry to reservation development. The indigenous network of knowledge was expanding.\(^{14}\)

Arriving in Billings as the featured speaker on the opening panel, Makhijani captivated the conference by offering the stunning suggestion that energy tribes model their approach after the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Ford Foundation’s energy expert first explained the central role energy held in the global economy and then walked the attending tribal leaders through OPEC’s history from exploited colonial states to “one of the most dominant economic forces in the world.” This remarkable transition, Makhijani explained, was due to its collective management of oil, and energy tribes could do the same with coal.\(^{15}\)

Of course, evoking the specter of an “a Native American OPEC” less than a year removed from the October 1973 Arab oil embargo and the infuriating fuel shortages it produced was a dangerous proposition.
Makhijani thus was careful not to emphasize OPEC’s cartel power in withholding oil and setting prices. Instead, similar to the benefits NANRDF organizers touted, he argued OPEC’s biggest attribute was its ability to collect and share information on global energy projects to ensure its members pursued similar strategies with their oil company partners. The same type of an organization, Makhijani argued, could serve the tribes well by “permit[ting] you to get a lot of knowledge about what your resources are [and] what the relation of those resources [are] to the U.S. and world energy picture.” Once these data were obtained, Makhijani continued, “it should be relatively easy for Indians to go into business for themselves, rather than lease to coal companies from which they’re usually not deriving adequate benefit.” Clearly encapsulated, this was the message of Indian-led economic development the NCAI had gathered the tribes to hear.  

With Makhijani articulating the path forward, subsequent speakers focused on the specific steps to carry out this project. Northern Cheyenne and Crow attorneys reviewed the actions they had taken to halt existing mining, but then focused their comments on how to develop reservation codes to shape future mining. George Crossland bashed existing federal regulations that restrained Indian entrepreneur-ship before he and others proposed changes to federal law that could give tribes flexibility to enter into promising commercial ventures beyond the standard lease form. Each of these suggestions reflected a new, forward-looking perspective that envisioned Indians controlling their own resources, and each called for a collective effort to make this goal a reality. Barney Old Coyote, a Crow tribal member and president of the American Indian National Bank, created to finance tribal ventures, used a football analogy to support the strategy. “You can have the best defensive unit in football,” Old Coyote told the audience, “but if you don’t have the ball, and you’re on the defensive all the time, you’re never going to win the ball game.” The energy tribes were ready to go on the offensive.  

At the end of the two-day Indian Energy Conference, Barney Old Coyote continued his football analogy by announcing that one of the offensive “plays” he and others had been exploring was a partnership
with the Federal Energy Office. Created in the wake of the Arab oil embargo to allocate reduced oil supplies and control prices, this temporary crisis-management office had become the hub of energy policy and planning under the Nixon administration. When the president and Congress created the permanent Federal Energy Administration (FEA) in summer 1974, the new agency largely absorbed the responsibilities and expertise of the Energy Office, including the search for ways to make the country energy independent. To carry out this goal, the FEA started exploring partnerships with groups outside the federal government, offering grants to fund private, domestic energy projects.\(^\text{18}\)

And here is where Old Coyote and his fellow tribal leaders saw an opening. Rather than have this new agency support mining projects designed by energy firms that rarely owned mineral resources yet profited greatly from their development, Old Coyote questioned the gathered tribes, “Why not have the Energy Office . . . start dealing [directly] with the Indian owners of resources and of energy in this country?” It was a question worth considering, even for a group conditioned to be wary of federal involvement in the development of their resources. Those in attendance began to recognize that they, as individual tribes or a consortium, could contract directly with the federal government to obtain funding to support mineral studies and development plans to produce energy for the nation and revenue for themselves.\(^\text{19}\)

The idea of forming a national coalition of energy tribes that would interface with the federal government to gather and share energy information quickly gained momentum. Six weeks after the energy conference in Billings, many of the same participants gathered at the NCAI’s national convention in Denver to share their insights with a broader audience. Arjun Makhijani, who, as NCAI Director Chuck Trimble explained, had “become famous overnight” within the Indian community, once again offered OPEC as a template for shifting “your tactics in a very fundamental way from defensive battles to assertion and recognition of your rights before anything happens [to your resources].” Makhijani cautioned, however, that in order to assert these rights, the energy tribes first needed to know exactly what resources they possessed. “You first of all have to know what you have got,” he warned. “If you don’t have this knowledge, then you will be at the mercy of the government and the companies, from the very start, as you have been in the past.” George Crossland echoed these comments, arguing
the tribes’ first step was to coordinate a national inventory of Indian resources, particularly those water rights so precious to any western development scheme.\textsuperscript{20}

Makhijani’s and Crossland’s warnings took on added importance in the winter of 1974–75 as it seemed that some federal agencies still planned to appropriate Northern Plains’ resources for Project Independence. On February 24, 1975, the Department of the Interior and the Army Corps of Engineers entered into a memorandum of understanding to market Upper Missouri River Basin water—much of which was committed to Indian reservations—for industrial purposes. Sensing their fears were coming to pass and that Indian resources would be auctioned away without their input, the energy tribes launched into action. Northern Plains’ tribal leaders traveled to Washington, D.C., to lodge their objections with federal officials and then submitted a formal letter of protest to President Gerald Ford, threatening a lawsuit that could tie up valuable water rights in litigation for years. It was the standard defensive tactic, but it was complemented by NANRDF’s and NCAI’s outreach to the new FEA Administrator Frank Zarb. Hoping to head off the federal appropriation of tribal water rights, these organizations requested that Zarb provide “heavy federal funding of engineering, economic, and socio-cultural studies to determine the presence and quantity of natural resources and the social and economic impact of development of those resources on Indian resources.”\textsuperscript{21}

Tasked with exploring all options to increase domestic production, FEA officials were eager to engage tribes possessing significant energy resources. On April 22, 1975, at an FEA “consumer workshop” in Denver, Deputy Administrator John Hill met with tribal groups from both the Northern Plains and the Southwest who had formed a unified “Indian caucus” to press their concerns. After meeting with Hill, this group issued a formal statement demanding that the president reaffirm the federal trustee duty to protect Indian assets and develop these resources “only with the informed consent, concurrence, and the active participation of each tribe.” Days later, many of these same caucus members then flew to Washington, D.C., to attend a meeting arranged by the NCAI between FEA Administrator Zarb and NANRDF representatives. While the Northern Plains group had scheduled the meeting to discuss FEA assistance to tribes in their region, when NANRDF members made their play for federal funds, the southwestern tribes
demanded their fair share as well. The hoped-for unity among energy tribes was being tested over the allocation of federal support, and the FEA began to understand how difficult it could be to formulate national policy for a diverse Native America.22

Despite the lack of unity displayed by the energy tribes—or because of it—this April 25 meeting set in motion the process that would produce the Council of Energy Resource Tribes. Once the diverse interests of the energy tribes became clear, Zarb commissioned an FEA task force to develop a comprehensive Indian energy position paper that evaluated the role of all Indian resources in meeting national energy goals and considered the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of reservation resource development. In typical bureaucratic fashion, the resulting position paper suggested an additional “interagency/Indian tribes task force” to obtain more tribal input for FEA’s national Indian energy policy. After a meager attempt to organize this new task force in San Francisco in June 1975 attracted only a handful of tribes, the FEA pushed for a much larger gathering in Washington, D.C., the following fall. This time, with both FEA Administrator Zarb and Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner Morris Thompson scheduled to attend, and travel expenses provided, representatives of more than twenty energy tribes from across the country arrived to discuss how the FEA could facilitate tribal energy development.23

In the halls of the Federal Energy Administration, the Council of Energy Resource Tribes was born. On September 16, 1975, attendees at this latest round of meetings spent a long opening day hearing from federal officials about how the FEA intended to increase domestic energy production and where Indian resources could fit into this goal. Tribal representatives understood the need for collective action, but as individual groups with diverse interests and concerns, the tribes debated how to respond. After spending two more days trying to organize themselves and develop a unified position, LaDonna Harris of the Americans for Indian Opportunity decided to aim for something lower. Seeing the tribes struggle to agree on substance, she gathered a small group of volunteers to focus on process. This group, which included NARF attorney Charles Lohah and Jicarilla Apache attorney Robert Nordhaus, then drafted an organizational charter to provide energy tribes with an institutional mechanism for communicating tribal desires to federal officials. The organization would be a mouthpiece but little
more. By the end of the day on September 18, fourteen of the twenty-three tribes present had signed the two-page charter drafted by Harris and company. They then proceeded to elect the charismatic chairman of the Navajo tribe, Peter MacDonald, as their leader. Common ground had been found over procedure, but not all were sure of the impact of their actions. Leaving the FEA’s Washington headquarters at one o’clock the following morning, LaDonna Harris recalls Charles Lohah turning to her and asking point blank, “What have we done?”

GROPING TOWARD AN IDENTITY: CERT’S FORMATIVE DAYS

CERT had been birthed by the federal desire to develop domestic energy sources but driven by energy tribes’ determination to take charge of reservation development. Its founding documents reflected the confused nature of its origins. Along the lines of the OPEC-style organization Arjun Makhijani proposed, CERT’s organizational charter envisioned a coalition of similarly situated tribes that would share energy information and cooperate to “promote the general welfare of the Energy Resource Tribes.” But issued concurrently with this charter was a longer list of recommendations to the FEA that emphasized the need for partnership between CERT and the federal government to respond to “the present ‘Energy Crisis’ and potential ‘Energy Disaster.’” This second document called for the creation of yet another task force under the newly created, cabinet-level Energy Resources Council—which Frank Zarb also directed—that would include the leaders of all energy tribes. This task force would work with the federal government to review the needs and practices of Indian resource development, make available federal assistance to support such projects, and monitor reservation mining. It seemed a worthy proposal, but together the two documents suggested conflicting organizations. On one hand, CERT’s charter called for an independent coalition of mutual interest to share information and strengthen each member’s negotiating position with energy companies and federal agencies; on the other, the position paper proposed an intimate, institutional connection between energy tribes and the federal government that blurred the lines between the two. Certainly, the tribes took momentous actions in Washington
that September, but it was hard to ascertain exactly what these actions meant.25

The creation of CERT confused even those tribes and tribal leaders that spearheaded the movement for a national coalition of energy tribes. Writing to NCAI Executive Director Charles Trimble a week after the FEA meetings, Northern Cheyenne President Allen Rowland noted that his and a few other important energy tribes had not signed the organization’s founding documents and suggested an Indian-only meeting, free of federal interference, to clarify CERT’s purpose. Like NARF attorney Charles Lohah, Rowland was not sure what CERT was. Responding dutifully, the NCAI brought the energy tribes back to the same Billings facility where Rowland and Crow Chairman Patrick Stands Over Bull had hosted the inaugural Indian energy conference a year earlier to better define the new organization.26

At this latest gathering of the energy tribes, confusion reigned. Was CERT an independent organization of energy tribes or simply a task force of the FEA? If an independent organization, what was its relationship to the Northern Plains federation known as NANRDF? Did their purposes align or would the organizations compete for federal funding and tribal membership? Would CERT subsume NANRDF? After hours of debate, NARF attorney Thomas Fredericks, who was now NANRDF’s executive director, attempted to clear the air. Believing CERT and NANRDF had similar goals but different functions, Fredericks recounted the series of meetings that led to CERT’s creation and then argued that “both groups can co-exist” because CERT’s only purpose was to act as “the organization or the vehicle to supply the administration with the consensus . . . of the Indian community as to what they feel about energy development on reservation lands and Indian country.” According to Fredericks, CERT was not an independent cartel but rather served as an important advisory body to federal policy makers, especially those agencies with money to invest in domestic energy production. “I think the whole concept of CERT,” Fredericks explained, “was that by having a voice in the administrative arm of government, that the monies that were available to really develop this energy could be . . . channeled to the Indian tribes because of the potential that exists on most reservations.” Fredericks and others used organizational charts depicting the federal bureaucracy to point out where
CERT would give Indians “a voice in the upper echelons of the energy policy makers to [force them to] come up with programs that would be relevant to the Indians’ needs.” The explanation seemed to quiet the controversy. After making his case, Fredericks then focused the meeting back on CERT’s demands to the FEA, walking the audience through a line-by-line analysis of its earlier list of recommendations. If CERT truly was a mouthpiece to provide Indian input into federal energy policy, crystallizing these demands was its most important task.\(^\text{27}\)

This interpretation that CERT’s primary role was to work within the federal government to advise policy makers and lobby for aid in Indian energy development set the organization’s early agenda. Cultivating federal connections, CERT requested $1 million in federal seed money to conduct a resource inventory study and then opened offices in Denver and Washington, D.C., to give the organization one foot in Indian Country and another in the Beltway. The organization also used federal funds to hire its first executive director, Ed Gabriel, an FEA staff member who was instrumental in forging the federal-tribal partnership. Apparently, raiding the federal bureaucracy to lead a pan-tribal organization charged with developing indigenous resources barely raised an eye. As Marjane Ambler explains, Gabriel “was a logical choice” due to the closeness of the CERT-FEA relationship. Be that as it may, tribal leaders that had been inspired a year earlier by calls for a “Native American OPEC” to wrest back control over reservation development must have wondered how their cause became so intimately entwined with the federal government.\(^\text{28}\)

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Fortunately for those desiring a more independent federation, the honeymoon between federal policy makers and CERT was short-lived. In March 1977, with a new Democratic administration prioritizing energy policy and promising a comprehensive energy program within its first ninety days, CERT Chairman Peter MacDonald challenged Jimmy Carter to address Indian energy concerns or else risk losing access to these valuable minerals. During the previous year and a half, MacDonald and his fellow tribal leaders had worked their federal connections to advance CERT’s mission, but they were becoming frustrated with the lack of results. The organization’s $1 million initial request,
Taking the Fight National

for instance, had not been met, and the BIA was blocking the FEA’s encroachment onto their traditional bureaucratic turf. MacDonald complained publicly, “We have gone to [multiple federal agencies] and pleaded for resources to inventory our minerals—pleaded for the kind of technical assistance necessary to achieve self-sufficiency,” but to no avail. Now, with the change in administration, MacDonald determined the time was right to deploy alternative tactics to secure the support tribes needed. Delivering a public speech in Phoenix, the Navajo and CERT chairman issued a not-so-veiled threat to federal officials:

Now, as some of you know, a dozen Indian nations have formed a domestic OPEC. We call it CERT. . . . We ask [for assistance] now quietly and constructively. We will not ask much longer. We will withhold future growth at any sacrifice if that is necessary to [tribal] survival.

In a few short lines, MacDonald made public an option energy tribes had been discussing for years. If the federal government would not willingly provide the tools energy tribes needed to intelligently and responsibly manage their resources, the Indians would convert CERT into an OPEC-style cartel to withhold desperately needed energy sources.29

Reflecting this bold, new approach, CERT members moved quickly to reframe their relationship with the federal government. Meeting days before President Carter’s April 18, 1977, “unpleasant talk” with the nation wherein he described the present energy crisis as the “moral equivalent of war,” CERT members issued a revised statement of demands that omitted any reference to the energy tribes acting as a task force within the executive bureaucracy. Instead, the statement repositioned CERT as an independent coalition of resource owners controlling “55 percent [of the nation’s] uranium, 30 percent of coal and 3 percent of petroleum and natural gas.” Considering this substantial tribal stockpile, CERT demanded “direct and constant” access to the secretary of energy. Never willing to give up on the federal-tribal partnership, though, CERT also dangled the possibility of cooperation if the federal government took four specific actions: (1) fund a comprehensive energy resource inventory, (2) help energy tribes construct alternative development agreements to the standard lease contracts, (3) provide capital for energy tribes to develop their own resources, and (4) educate tribal leaders in proper energy resource planning. Although not new requests, energy tribes’ crystallized their most crucial demands
for tribal control. And if the demands were not new, the negotiating strategy certainly was. If the feds wanted access to Indian resources, they now would have to engage with an independent cartel threatening to withhold energy resources crucial to the country’s growth.30

Apparently, federal officials were unmoved by the new tactic, and so in the summer of 1977 MacDonald dramatically upped the ante by transforming the OPEC analogy into a potential partnership with the oil-exporting countries. In July, the CERT chairman met with several OPEC members in Washington, D.C., of all places, to discuss how these former colonial nations had gained control over their valuable resources. Noting that “federal red tape and foot dragging” had left him no other options, MacDonald assured national reporters covering these meetings that he was “not looking for advice on how to impose an embargo” but instead “our purpose is more long range,” seeking technical assistance on how to structure mineral development deals, plan for sustainable development, and market Indian minerals. Still, news of Arab and tribal leaders meeting in the nation’s capital to discuss potentially withholding valuable energy resources garnered much attention, which was exactly what MacDonald intended. On his own reservation, the Navajo tribal chairman had made a political living framing energy projects as a colonial appropriation of Indian resources to feed American growth. For years, he had even compared the Navajo nation to the exploited OPEC states and advocated that his tribe follow a similar anticolonial approach to resource management. “From now on,” MacDonald had announced in the Navajo Times in March 1974, “the Navajos intend to use the same kind of tactics that oil-rich Arabs have employed. Our goal is the same: a bigger take from our desert Kingdom.” Now, in 1977, the CERT chairman hoped that by cementing a formal relation with these Middle Eastern states—or at least appearing to—he could goad the federal government into following through on promises of support for all energy tribes.31

Seeking a partnership with OPEC and, more important, cultivating CERT’s public image as the “Native American OPEC” was a bold move with, at best, mixed results. The strategy got the federal government’s attention and perhaps produced initially a few more federal dollars. But as Marjane Ambler reports, it also ignited a public backlash against “unpatriotic Indians” who appeared to be withholding American energy. This anti-CERT sentiment hit a fever pitch in January 1979, when
an exiled zealot named Ruhollah Khomeini led an Islamic Revolution that toppled the Iranian monarchy. The loss of oil from the world’s second largest exporter disrupted global markets, and although other Middle Eastern states worked to offset the deficit, panic quickly set in. Oil companies and consumers alike rushed to obtain the petroleum they feared would not be available the next day. In a repeat of the 1973 energy crisis that had heightened demand for Northern Plains’ coal, the nation endured its second bout of frustrating fuel shortages. America’s disdain for foreign oil producers had never been higher.\textsuperscript{32}

The same was true of the country’s feelings toward energy tribes. CERT continued to request more and more federal dollars throughout late 1970s, including $2 million in 1978 and an astonishing $60 to $70 million in 1979. But in the wake of the second energy crisis, these requests now appeared to most Americans as blackmail during the country’s time of need. As the \textit{Denver Post} editorialized in 1979: “Supposedly we are to pony up cheerfully so the noose of escalating energy prices can be tightened around our necks? The energy crisis is too important for confrontational politics, which, if pursued likely will boomerang and hurt the Indian cause rather than help it.” This is exactly what happened. CERT kept requesting money, but federal officials could not justify supporting an organization touting its ties to the Middle East.\textsuperscript{33}

Peter MacDonald was not deaf to the events capturing the nation’s attention and understood the need for another shift in strategy. Writing to President Carter days after his famed July 15, 1979, “crisis of confidence” speech, wherein the president challenged the nation to fight “on the battlefield of energy [so] we can win for our nation a new confidence,” MacDonald maintained his defiant tone but recommitted Indian energy to the fight. Telling the president he was disheartened Native Americans had not been included in Carter’s new energy program, the CERT chairman nevertheless affirmed, “Today I offer my support, and that of the 24 other CERT energy-producing tribes, to the president and his Administration, and will await his direction.” Of course, that support would come with a price, but MacDonald was reaching out to change the trajectory of federal-tribal relations.\textsuperscript{34}

Carter soon took the CERT chairman up on his offer to provide Indian energy to the nation. Within the month, Charles Duncan, the newly confirmed secretary of energy, met with Peter MacDonald
and then dispatched his assistant director, Richard Stone, to CERT’s December 1979 annual meeting. At that gathering, CERT members unveiled proposals for several new reservation energy projects, including two large coal-fired generating plants, an oil refinery, and a coal gasification facility. Impressed by the Indians’ efforts, Stone responded with the federal commitment CERT had been seeking. His $24 million pledge included $10 million for specific tribal projects, $7 million for an Indian resource inventory, and another $2 million to cover CERT’s day-to-day operations. In the heat of a yet another “energy crisis,” MacDonald and his fellow tribal leaders learned that playing the role of an independent broker for Indian energy resources worked far more effectively than the alternative of an antagonistic cartel threatening to withhold valuable minerals.  

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With this lesson learned, the 1979 CERT annual meeting should have presented a scene of congratulatory celebration for the young organization. Instead, reaching its goal of obtaining federal support caused yet another round of deep introspection by CERT’s members. Those Indians, like many within the chairman’s own Navajo tribe, who had adopted a nationalistic stance toward controlling their minerals now questioned CERT’s authority to speak for their tribal governments and commit reservation resources to the American market. According to Marjane Ambler, other tribal members who desired to halt all reservation mining protested what they saw as CERT’s new position as “an elitist broker of Indian resources . . . prostituting its members’ land and people in exchange for energy agency dollars.” Winona LaDuke even describes one group of “traditional people” from the Navajo Reservation crashing the 1979 Phoenix meeting, demanding “that the indigenous members of CERT realize their traditional and spiritual ways of survival and their responsibility to the earth and their people.” Ironically, at the height of its influence with federal officials, CERT appeared to be crumbling from the inside. As CERT’s executive director, Ed Gabriel, later admitted, “We got what we asked for [at the 1979 Phoenix meeting], but it took us more than a year to recover.”

To restore legitimacy in the eyes of all its constituents, CERT shifted focus from selling the benefits of Indian energy development to federal
officials and toward proving the organization’s value to tribal leaders and members. The first step was to clarify that the bulk of federal dollars CERT secured would go directly to benefit tribal energy programs, not into the organization’s coffer. Thus, just days after the Phoenix meeting, CERT explained in its newsletter that the government’s $24 million pledge would fund specific reservation inventories and feasibility studies “and not be channeled through CERT.” The organization then focused its activities on providing consulting services to individual tribes desiring development—which, of course, could be paid for with these new funds—rather than assume the role as spokesperson for all energy tribes. To do so, CERT grew its technical assistance center in Denver, where by 1981 two-thirds of its sixty employees were located, leaving only a small lobbying team in Washington. The geologists, energy consultants, and former federal employees in the Denver office understood the type of information tribes needed to pursue development, and most important, they knew how to obtain funds to gather that information. Through assisting tribes in putting together federal grant applications and private lending documents, CERT officials claimed that, by 1981, they had secured $17 million for tribal energy projects that would not have been available otherwise. Federal bureaucrats also recognized CERT’s value in this endeavor. Energy Department official Richard Stone explained that in this period of unprecedented federal investment in energy development, federal money “goes to those who produce good paper, [and] the paper CERT has produced on behalf of the tribes has been of consistently good quality.”

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By producing “good paper” to secure funding for potential energy projects, CERT was positioning energy tribes to finally capitalize on their vast and valuable resources if they chose to do so. A voluntary coalition of independent sovereigns, CERT itself had no authority to commit Indian resources. Instead, the grants and loans it helped secure would fund reservation inventories and feasibility studies to allow tribal leaders to make their own informed decisions. Of course, CERT often benefited by conducting these studies itself, getting paid with the same federal dollars it secured for tribal governments. The individual projects CERT helped evaluate included a natural gas refinery on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation; a hydroelectric facility for the Nez Perce; oil, gas, and geothermal projects with the Cheyenne River Sioux; and the nation’s first synthetic fuel facility on the Crow
Reservation. Clearly, CERT worked to develop tribal energy, but by the start of the new decade, the OPEC template was dead. In its place was something more closely resembling a professional consulting firm. CERT had become a pan-tribal organization with the business experience and technical expertise to empower tribal governments to manage their own resources.  

Not all American Indians, however, were happy with this outcome. CERT’s close ties with—and some would say, dependence on—the federal government continued to draw criticism that the organization was a pro-development entity ignoring the concerns of ordinary Indians. Winona LaDuke, the Ojibwe environmental activist and future Green Party vice presidential candidate, complained that of the approximately one hundred studies CERT was conducting or had completed by 1980, only five focused on mineral development’s harmful impacts. The rest, she concluded, supported “non-renewable, extractive, and technologically-advanced development scenarios.” When CERT officials defended its focus on development by reminding LaDuke that “CERT does only what the tribal chairmen request,” the activist responded by reminding them that “the choices and options presented to each tribe originate in reports from the CERT staff.” Those studies, of course, overwhelmingly supported large-scale energy projects oriented toward exporting Indian resources off-reservation.

The criticism was fair, but it failed to resonate widely. For a majority of American Indians who knew only suffocating poverty, the chance to develop reservation minerals under the control of their tribal governments was too great an opportunity to forego. In the end, disgruntled Indians like LaDuke were not CERT’s clients; the tribal governments were. The organization thus focused on expanding tribal capacity by securing funds to study energy projects and educate elected officials on the institutional controls necessary to shape mining operations. Ed Gabriel admitted freely that his goal was to transfer his organization’s expertise over to the tribes so that CERT could close its technical assistance center by the mid-1980s and focus purely on lobbying. Its members shared this goal, as Hugh Baker, director of energy for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, explained:

People who have problems with CERT should think of the concept behind forming it. I continually remind the CERT staff, “You’re here to put yourselves out of business by teaching me. When we, [the tribes] get
rich on [energy resources], maybe you can come work for us. Until then, help us get rich.”

CERT worked in many ways to transfer knowledge to its tribal clients, but perhaps the greatest lesson it offered was that tribal governments must control the pace and scale of mining to ensure profits without sacrificing community. Gathering mineral and market data was an important first step, but mainly because this information better positioned tribes to negotiate the mineral agreements that controlled mining operations and profits. As for these agreements, CERT consultants constantly hammered home the need for tribal leaders to reject mineral “leases,” which afforded tribes little control, and instead pursue “alternative contracts” that retained tribal ownership over mining ventures. Ownership, they lectured, guaranteed control.

And at least initially, the federal government seemed to agree. BIA officials tentatively supported the use of alternative contracts as a way to open reservations to development under tribal terms. As we will see, however, these officials eventually questioned whether federal law provided tribal governments with the authority to develop their own resources under these alternative contracts. The old concerns about Indian capacity to responsibly manage their assets, which were embedded in the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act, came back to the fore. Energy tribes, facing the possibility that they would be denied the right to exercise their newly developed capacity, once again would have to mobilize to protect this most basic principle of sovereignty. This time their fight would take them all the way to the halls of Congress.
Recognizing Tribal Sovereignty

AS THE ENERGY tribes gathered for the September 1980 annual meeting of the Council of Energy Resource Tribes, they had good reason to be optimistic. Earlier that year, the federal government had made good on its $24 million pledge to support Indian energy development. The tribes had put these funds to work developing an extensive Indian resource inventory, conducting feasibility studies for new energy technologies, breaking ground on tribal mining projects, and continuing to educate tribal leaders on resource management techniques. In addition to the flow of federal dollars, the Department of the Interior had also just proposed new regulations for mining on Indian lands that promised to minimize “any adverse environmental or cultural impact on Indians, resulting from such development” as well as guaranteeing the tribes “at least, fair market value for their ownership rights.” The key to delivering these results was a new provision authorizing Indian mineral owners to enter into flexible mineral agreements that “reserve to them the responsibility for overseeing the development of their reserves.” These “alternative contracts” to the standard lease form would finally provide tribes with the control necessary to ensure mining did not threaten their indigenous communities.1

Reflecting the improved relationship with the federal government, CERT held its 1980 annual gathering in Washington, D.C. There, Chairman Peter MacDonald explained that the meeting’s purpose was
to further explore “how to go about building a truly meaningful energy partnership between the tribes and the federal government.” Federal officials played their part enthusiastically: Energy Secretary Charles Duncan delivered the keynote address, and numerous governors, senators, and members of Congress attended the event to endorse the strengthening tribal-federal relationship. The three presidential candidates—Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and the independent congressman John Anderson—either personally attended or sent congressional delegates to voice their support for tribal autonomy and lobby for CERT’s endorsement. Speaking at the concluding press conference, Senator John Melcher of Montana captured the shared sentiment: “No longer can the federal government dictate the terms of energy development on Indian lands [and] no longer can the government decide what is good for the Indian people.” All the years of work seemed to be paying off. Again, optimism abounded.²

But to those paying close attention, there were rumblings of trouble in the recesses of the conference’s meeting hall. In fact, despite the recent contribution of funds, promising new regulations, and supportive messages, Wilfred Scott, CERT’s vice chairman, noted “mixed signals” coming from federal officials over whether tribes had the legal authority to manage their own minerals. The specific source of these concerns was a recent oil and gas deal struck between the Northern Cheyenne and the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) that deviated from standard lease form and procedure. This agreement, like a lease, conveyed exploration and production rights to the oil company, but it retained for the Northern Cheyenne certain ownership interests in the project. Moreover, the Northern Cheyenne procured this alternative oil and gas contract through private negotiations rather than via the standard public notice and bidding process. Government officials wondered aloud whether federal law allowed a deal that failed to comply with the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act, even if it represented a clear exercise of tribal sovereignty. After delaying approval until a tribal referendum established that a majority of Northern Cheyenne supported the project, the Department of the Interior grudgingly authorized the arrangement only after ARCO agreed to assume the risk should a court later invalidate the contract.³

More troubling than the reluctant approval, however, was Interior’s announcement made shortly after CERT’s annual meeting. The Northern Cheyenne contract had forced the agency to review the law
governing reservation mineral rights, and the department’s new lead attorney, Clyde O. Martz, did not like what he saw. A former University of Colorado law professor and oft-described “father of natural resource law,” Martz reasoned that “the Indian Nonintercourse Act prohibits contracts that convey interest in land unless they meet the requirements of the 1938 Mineral Leasing Act.” Finding no other statutory authorization for alternative contracts like the one just entered into by the Northern Cheyenne, the solicitor told CERT staff that any contract conveying Indian minerals “other than the traditional lease, may currently be illegal.” Once again, the federal government threatened to constrain tribal sovereignty.4

Martz’s statement regarding the legality of alternative contracts sent shockwaves through the energy tribes’ community. Peter MacDonald called it the “final betrayal,” rendering “everything CERT tribes have been doing or want to do . . . illegal.” This strong reaction stemmed from the fact that tribes had come to view alternative agreements as the linchpin for exerting control over reservation development. They were the mechanism that allowed tribal leaders to apply their increasing expertise to secure desirable terms and oversee mining operations. Without non-lease contracts, the progress of the previous decade could be lost, turning back the clock to the days of federally run bidding procedures, standard lease terms, and minimal tribal control. Martz’s opinion even threw the legality of his own agency’s recently proposed rulemaking into question. How could an executive agency promise to allow tribes “to enter into contracts which reserve to them the responsibility for overseeing the development of their [mineral] reserves” if federal statutes limited energy contracts to the standard lease form? Federal officials had promised Indian self-determination but now seemed poised to invalidate clear exercises of tribal sovereignty. Certainly, energy tribes had come a long way in developing the capacity to manage their own resources. Now, it appeared, there was work left to be done to ensure that federal law recognized their authority to do so.5

“THE MOST IMPORTANT TRIBE IN AMERICA,” REPRISE

The Northern Cheyenne’s measured pursuit of energy development forced federal officials to address the disconnect between federal laws governing Indian resources and tribes’ increasing capacity to manage
these assets. Since the Northern Cheyenne’s successful 1974 challenge to its inequitable coal leases, the tribe had been working to develop its vast energy reserves in a manner that balanced the need for revenue with the desire to preserve its indigenous community and environment. The first step in this process was ensuring that the tribe, not individual allottees, actually owned the minerals underlying the reservation. Like the Crow’s allotment law, the Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act had reserved subsurface mineral rights to the tribe, but only for a period of fifty years. The intent was to provide the initial means for an economic base but ultimately to have these rights flow to individual landowners. Prior to the 1960s, however, there was no viable market for Cheyenne oil, gas, or coal. Sensing the tribe had missed its opportunity to capitalize on communal resources, both federal and tribal officials lobbied to have the mineral rights transferred to the tribe in perpetuity. In 1968, Congress obliged, passing a law effectuating this permanent transfer.

But federal support for tribal ownership of mineral rights came with conditions. Not wanting to create liability from an unconstitutional taking of private property rights, the 1968 law conditioned the permanent transfer on a determination by a federal court that the 1926 Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act had not created vested mineral rights in allottees. In other words, Congress practically demanded litigation, placing the Northern Cheyenne in the unenviable position of having to sue its own members to settle property rights. Seeing little alternative, the tribe commenced legal action in summer 1970 against several allottees who stood to gain mineral rights at the end of the fifty-year period. By 1976, the case had made its way to the United States Supreme Court, where, in Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, the court upheld the permanent transfer of minerals to the tribe. Specifically, the unanimous opinion found that the conveyance conformed to the 1926 act’s original intent that the tribe benefit from their minerals, which clearly had not yet happened.6

In the same year the Northern Cheyenne confirmed tribal rights over reservation minerals, the tribe also forged new legal ground to shape regional energy projects threatening its reservation. Recall that in 1972, the planned construction of the Colstrip Power Plant at the reservation’s border had helped unite the tribe with area ranchers and environmentalists against regional coal development. This partnership spread concerns about impending energy projects and produced the Northern
Cheyenne’s historic petition to cancel all reservation leases. It did not, however, stop construction at Colstrip. By 1976, two coal-fired boilers were in operation with plans announced for two additional units that were twice the size of the originals. All told, this facility had the potential to produce 2,100 megawatts of electricity, making it larger than the country’s dirtiest power plant, the Four Corners facility, located on the edge of the Navajo Reservation.\(^7\)

With a massive power plant planned at the reservation’s border, and just beyond the reach of the tribal government, the Northern Cheyenne got creative. The tribe turned to new relief offered by the 1970 Clean Air Act and announced in July of 1976 that it would reclassify the air above its reservation as a Class I air shed. Under the pioneering 1970 environmental law, the Environmental Protection Agency had established a nationwide area classification system to prevent the deterioration of air quality in regions with relatively clean air. Initially the EPA designated all air sheds as Class II areas, which would allow for some air quality degradation due to light industry. The implementing regulations, however, gave state and tribal governments the option to protect specific areas from virtually any change in air quality by requesting an upgrade. In June 1976, the state of Montana approved the Colstrip plant’s expansion based on modeling that showed its air emissions would not violate the region’s Class II standards. Two weeks later, Northern Cheyenne President Allen Rowland announced plans to reclassify his downwind reservation to the higher, cleaner standard.\(^8\)

As the first land manager in the nation, whether state or tribal government, to request an upgrade in air quality protection, the Northern Cheyenne garnered many accolades from the environmental community. One publication even named the tribe “Environmentalist of the Year” for 1976. But more than a defense of the natural environment was at play. The tribe took action primarily to ensure the integrity of its social and cultural community. This was the same concern that rallied tribal members to halt on-reservation mining. Massive energy development on or near the reservation would despoil the Cheyenne’s land, air, and water, but even more so, it would bring outsiders to disrupt social customs and cultural norms that defined the tribe. Numerous tribal members and groups, including the Northern Cheyenne Landowners Association, made this exact point to the state of Montana during Col-
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strip's permitting process. The tribal government's official comments warned that development on the reservation's border "portend[s] nothing but adverse environmental, social and cultural consequences for the People of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, their way of life, and the natural resources of their Reservation Lands." These comments further explained the tribe's opposition within the context of its long and difficult history to secure the reservation:

Not only is the Reservation the Northern Cheyenne Tribe's Home Land; as a Tribe, as a People, it is their only place in this world. The Tribe's life as a People, as the Tribe knows and desires to maintain it, is unqualifiedly dependent upon maintaining its Reservation free from outside environmental insult and destructive social and cultural impact.

But these pleas went unheeded and the state of Montana issued Colstrip's permit. The tribe was now forced to take its argument to the federal level. Writing to the EPA to request the redesignation of the reservation's air shed, Allen Rowland was clear about Cheyenne intentions:

We are not requesting this redesignation because we are against progress, either here or anywhere else. Our Tribe has been struggling for progress and self-determination for years. . . . For us, progress means developing our environmental resources in renewable and compatible manners. . . . Not only are such activities our livelihood, they are the cores of our value systems as a people.

The Northern Cheyenne did not oppose energy development per se, just projects beyond tribal control because they threatened the community. The tribe thus exercised its sovereign rights under the Clean Air Act to prevent a project that would change the fabric of its region and reservation.9

As powerful as this argument was, the Northern Cheyenne could only shape, not preclude, regional energy development. The EPA granted the tribe's request to upgrade their air designation and stepped in to halt Colstrip's expansion based on expected impacts to the new Class I air shed. Colstrip's owners responded, however, by adding new pollution control technologies that they claimed would drastically reduce emissions. The move satisfied EPA officials, whose focus remained on protecting environmental quality. In fall 1979, the agency approved the issuance of Colstrip's long-awaited expansion permit.10
But again, the Northern Cheyenne had broader concerns than just the environment. The tribe filed a legal challenge to the EPA’s approval, and the longtime head of the Natural Resources Committee, Edwin Dahle, began exploring a negotiated settlement that would allow for Colstrip’s construction and alleviate tribal fears over the unhealthy influx of non-Indians and pollutants. Ultimately, Colstrip’s owners and the Northern Cheyenne settled on what CERT Executive Director Ed Gabriel described as “a precedent-setting, multi-faceted agreement” whereby the facility would install more stringent pollution controls, fund reservation air quality monitoring, provide $350,000 to the tribe for continued socioeconomic impact analyses, and guarantee employment and job training at Colstrip for tribal members. Certainly the outcome did not please all Cheyenne, but these concessions addressed the tribe’s major fears. As Dahle explained, the agreement reduced the threat of unwanted people and pollutants and meant “wealth will be coming into the reservation, not just flowing out, as it has in the past.” Dahle also believed the agreement would help the tribe “develop a trained workforce for the day when the Cheyenne might develop our own coal.”

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The Northern Cheyenne’s willingness to negotiate and tailor the Colstrip facility to address specific tribal concerns signaled a shift in the tribe’s approach to energy development. Throughout much of the 1970s, the tribal government had found itself on the defensive, fighting to prevent projects it did not control rather than pursuing energy ventures that could bring wealth. This approach began to change, however, with the fall 1978 election of new council members eager to explore development options. This rush of new blood coincided with mounting debt accrued through the tribe’s various legal battles and the real possibility of reduced federal support for tribal programs. Now that the tribe had secured its authority over reservation resources—not to mention demonstrated its ability to shape off-reservation development—the time had come to exercise this power to produce revenue. As Allen Rowland explained, “We’ve made millionaires out of several lawyers”; now it was the tribe’s turn.
This shift toward a more assertive pursuit of tribal-controlled development was evident on the very first day the new council members took office. Sworn in on September 13, 1978, by none other than Marie Sanchez, who by now was a tribal judge, the newly elected leaders endured a crash course in reservation energy development. CERT consultants were brought in to lead a three-day orientation program featuring CERT Executive Director Ed Gabriel, National Congress of American Indians President Chuck Trimble, Native American Rights Fund attorneys John Echo Hawk and Scott McLaroy, and the tribe’s own attorney, Steven Chestnutt, who had spearheaded the petition to halt uncontrolled reservation mining. The new officers also heard from Dick Monteau, director of the Northern Cheyenne Research Project (NCRP) that had been established after the first round of harmful coal leases in 1973 to investigate coal mining’s impacts. Supported by federal funds, the NCRP was a quasi-independent arm of the tribal government that gathered economists, geologists, anthropologists, and energy consultants to inventory Cheyenne resources and evaluate mining proposals. It provided the internal, institutional expertise the Northern Cheyenne had lacked when the tribe eagerly auctioned away reservation coal rights in the early 1970s. In evaluating potential energy projects, the NCRP also was guided by the founding principles of “maintaining survival [of the Northern Cheyenne] as an ethnic group” and “aiding in the maintenance of Tribal identity and sovereignty.”

With the Northern Cheyenne’s renewed interest in energy development, it did not take long for the NCRP to prove its worth. In summer 1979, several energy companies approached the tribe with new coal mining ventures, and the tribe referred these proposals to the NCRP for analysis. The staff there quickly concluded that although cloaked in the language of joint partnerships, these latest deals shared similar deficiencies with the previous leases. Namely, they provided no tribal control over the pace and scale of development. Without such control, the NCRP warned the tribe would be unable to protect its community and environment. Hearing these critiques, the Northern Cheyenne rejected the offers out of hand.

But more than tribal control was now required for on-reservation energy projects. Among the general membership, concerns about coal development’s impacts had grown so strong that even when a proposal
provided control, tribal members were wary to authorize strip-mining. In response to the deficient 1979 deals, for instance, tribal consultant George Crossland—the Osage attorney who initially found fault with the Northern Cheyenne’s earlier coal leases—introduced a coal mining proposal from the Fluor Corporation that would have allowed the tribe to retain complete ownership over the venture. Fluor, the world’s largest construction firm, offered to operate the proposed mine under a service contract. But even this was too much. The wounds of the recent coal mining wars were fresh, and tribal members rejected this promising deal structure. Council member Joe Little Coyote explained the reaction: “Because of the impact on our socio-economic and cultural development, coal mining is not an option at all at this point.” Tribal members simply could not overcome the idea that massive strip mines would disrupt community relations and despoil their landscapes.

With reservation coal mining a dead issue, pro-development tribal leaders quickly turned to the seemingly less invasive option of oil and gas drilling as the vehicle for economic growth. Ironically, the initial push for this form of development came from the NCRP, which, according to employee James Boggs, typically operated under “a policy of caution and skepticism towards large-scale leasing.” Considering this viewpoint, the organization’s director, Richard Monteau, had for some time been exploring the possibility of a small, tribally owned and operated oil and gas project as an alternative to massive strip-mining. When tribal members rejected all coal mining offers in the fall of 1979, pro-development council members appropriated the idea for oil and gas production and expanded the scope of Monteau’s small proposal to fit their larger objectives. In December 1979, these leaders then consolidated authority over energy development decisions by passing a resolution bringing the NCRP under the direct supervision of the tribe’s Planning Committee, which was controlled by the pro-development wing. In protest, much of the NCRP’s staff, including Director Monteau, resigned. With the cautious NCRP eviscerated, the path was cleared to pursue large-scale oil and gas projects.

To land such a deal, the Northern Cheyenne turned the typical, federally controlled process for soliciting and evaluating energy proposals on its head. Rejecting the standard public notice and bidding process, the tribe advertised directly for mining partners in national oil and gas trade journals. By February 1980, Tribal President Allen Rowland
could report that the response was “very good . . . proposals are coming in daily.” But to evaluate these offers, the Northern Cheyenne turned not to federal officials; instead, it relied largely on its own expertise, augmenting this knowledge where necessary with some Bureau of Indian Affairs technical assistance. Several tribal members argued that the loss of the NCRP had left the tribe unprepared to effectively evaluate drilling proposals, but Harvard-educated tribal member Joe Little Coyote skillfully led negotiations with potential energy partners. In May, the tribal government settled on an agreement with the independent oil firm Atlantic Richfield Company that gave the tribe a $6 million upfront bonus and a 2.5 percent production share. Beyond these unprecedented financial benefits, the contract also stipulated that the Northern Cheyenne would retain joint ownership over all geological data and would hold approval authority over all operating plans, and that ARCO would fund a Tribal Oil and Gas Office to monitor drilling activities. This was not your typical lease. Instead, it resembled more a service agreement in which the drilling company would prospect and produce reservation oil and gas in exchange for a share of the profits. Importantly, the Northern Cheyenne retained control.17

Most, though certainly not all, tribal members viewed the ARCO deal as a sensible compromise between all-out development and none at all. Opponents pointed to the relatively hasty manner in which the deal was constructed and the absence of the NCRP to evaluate its impacts. But when these concerns were put to the entire tribe in the form of two referenda on the ARCO agreement, an overwhelming majority sided with their tribal government (82 percent in the first, 88 in the second). Yes, the tribe would open its reservation to an outside developer, but most were comfortable with the tribal government retaining oversight over drilling operations and ownership of geological data. Furthermore, many defended the deal on environmental grounds. Allen Rowland noted simply that drilling pads leave smaller holes in the ground than do coal mines, and Joe Little Coyote concurred that oil wells “are a lot more environmentally acceptable than coal mining.” The Department of the Interior also agreed, describing the ARCO project in its environmental assessment as “the first major energy development on the reservation, but it is small-scale when compared to other energy development alternatives such as strip-mining.” In a world of trade-offs, the impoverished Northern Cheyenne determined that some
energy development, operating under the supervision of its Tribal Oil and Gas Office, was better than none at all.18

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The Northern Cheyenne’s increasing sophistication in managing its valuable energy resources was emblematic of advances occurring throughout Indian Country. Since 1975, numerous tribes had positioned themselves to negotiate alternative contracts that included better financial terms than the BIA’s standard leases. Although not all deals resulted in tribal-led mining ventures, each evidenced the tribes’ increasing capacity to tailor contracts to reflect specific reservation conditions. For example, on the Navajo Reservation, where the tribal government had the most experience with mineral development and possessed ample geological and market data, the tribe brokered a 1977 uranium deal with the Exxon Corporation that netted a $6 million bonus and included the option for a joint venture operation. On the Blackfeet Reservation, however, where less geological information existed, tribal leaders willingly gave up bonus payments in favor of an oil and gas agreement with the Damson Oil Corporation that included percentage royalties plus half of all production revenue once the company recouped its start-up costs (potentially 58 percent of all profits). In this case, Blackfeet leaders may not have secured ownership over the energy project, but they understood that a back-loaded service contract was necessary to encourage the small, independent oil company to prospect in a relatively unproven area. And like other tribes, the Blackfeet knew federally orchestrated leases did not meet tribal demands. As one BIA area director explained, “The difference [now] is that the tribes are fully informed about the market value of their holdings and the [problems with the] leasing strategy.” Kenneth Black, the director of the National Tribal Chairman’s Association, summed up the demands of these newly enlightened leaders: “No more leases—we want a percentage of the deals.”19

Tribal efforts to secure more beneficial agreements certainly indicated a rising level of sophistication, but their alternative contracts also put the Department of the Interior in the difficult position of trying to support Indian self-determination while also enforcing the letter of the law. Federal agents did their best to juggle these competing duties,
employing a host of innovative legal theories to approve negotiated contracts that deviated from the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act. One such theory applied a broad reading of the term “lease” contained in the statute, rationalizing that the 1938 Congress surely intended to authorize whatever form of mineral contract was favored by industry standards, and thus joint ventures must be allowed. Another approach justified non-lease mining agreements based on an obscure federal statute authorizing tribes to enter into “service contracts,” though this law had been previously applied only to approve contracts for tribal attorneys. By 1980, then, the Interior Department had approved a handful of alternative contracts based on these legal theories, but the piecemeal approach left the law unsettled. Serious concerns remained as to the authority of tribes to negotiate their own contracts and participate directly in the development of reservation resources.20

With the Northern Cheyenne–ARCO agreement, Interior Solicitor Clyde Martz had seen enough. After first delaying his review of the contract until the September 1980 tribal referendum confirmed that a strong majority supported the deal—again, more than 80 percent were in favor—Martz then suspended federal approval until two issues could be resolved. One, the solicitor questioned whether the contract conveyed a property interest in Northern Cheyenne minerals, making it a “lease” that then failed to comply with the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act. Two, Martz wondered whether any other laws beyond the 1938 act authorized such a mineral agreement. Hoping to slap a pragmatic solution onto a sticky legal question, the Northern Cheyenne and ARCO quickly executed a “Statement of Intent” noting the parties themselves did not consider the agreement a lease but instead a service contract authorized by existing law. For good measure, ARCO also agreed not to sue the federal government if a court later invalidated the agreement.21

This stop-gap solution eased some of Martz’s immediate concerns, but the former law school professor was most interested in a long-term fix that could clarify tribal authority once and for all. Martz was sympathetic to tribal aims, but his hands were tied without further congressional action. Pulling in Montana Senator John Melcher, all parties thus agreed to support legislation that would, according to Northern Cheyenne Vice President George Hiwalker, Jr., “remove any uncertainty that may exist regarding the Secretary’s . . . authority to approve such
agreements, and to provide Indian tribes with a clear alternative to the 1938 Minerals [sic] Leasing Act.” With a legislative solution proposed, and ARCO’s promise not to sue, Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus had enough assurances to approve the Northern Cheyenne–ARCO agreement on September 23, 1980. A few days later, Martz made the startling announcement that, without clarifying legislation, other alternative agreements may be illegal. As he did so, however, both Senator Melcher and the Solicitor’s Office had already begun work on legislation to recognize tribal authority to enter into these vital contracts.22

“DOING BUSINESS WITH INDIAN TRIBES”: THE 1982 INDIAN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT ACT

Just as it had done in stopping inequitable leasing practices earlier in the decade, the Northern Cheyenne provided the specific impetus for changing federal law to recognize tribes’ sovereign control over reservation development. But the tribe, of course, did not operate in a vacuum. Broader changes in federal Indian affairs created a sense of urgency that helped push the new legislation through Congress. These changes were set in motion barely a month after the Department of the Interior approved the Northern Cheyenne–ARCO agreement when the country elected Ronald Reagan as its fortieth president. A California conservative who sought to extend many of the policies of his fellow Californian Richard Nixon, Reagan proclaimed his support for Nixon’s Indian self-determination policy and its goal of strengthening tribal governments so as to lessen federal dependency. But like Nixon, Reagan inherited a sputtering national economy and a burgeoning federal bureaucracy, two problems he aimed to remedy with deep cuts in government spending. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Indian programs topped the list of expendable items. The president’s first budget proposed more than $1 billion in cuts to the 1982 federal Indian budget, representing a 34 percent reduction. These cuts included a 77 percent reduction in economic development programs and a 46 percent reduction to programs assisting Indian energy resource management.23

But the real blow to Indian energy development was actually much worse. The only Indian energy programs Reagan proposed to leave intact were those run by the BIA to inventory Indian minerals and oversee mineral leasing; the Department of Energy’s entire tribal energy
program, which provided the backbone of support for CERT and specific Indian energy projects, was on the chopping block. Adding insult to injury, the president also appointed western attorney James Watt as the new Interior secretary. As president of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, Watt had just filed an amicus brief to the Supreme Court challenging tribal rights to tax energy companies operating on their reservation. The multifront attack on tribal-controlled energy development so alarmed energy tribes that CERT Chairman Peter MacDonald immediately wrote to Congress complaining that the new administration seemed determined to “return to an era of . . . giveaways of tribal oil, gas and coal resources.”

Energy tribes fought hard against Reagan’s budget cuts in Congress, but the unmistakable trend of diminishing federal support forced tribal leaders to reassess their strategies for pursuing energy development. With 74 percent of CERT’s 1981 budget pegged to federal funds, energy tribes could not simply wait and hope that Congress would reverse the trend. These groups needed immediate cash to continue consulting services and capital for mining projects already in development. To fill the financial gap left by a retreating federal government, CERT reached out to private industry. Styling its 1981 annual meeting as “Doing Business with Indian Tribes,” CERT’s Executive Director Ed Gabriel pressed hard for industry attendance, touting the tribes’ vast natural resources and assuring potential investors that “the Indian people are amenable to bold, innovative business proposals of all types.” The only stipulation, Gabriel noted in his letter to industry invitees, was that the deals must “recognize and respect [the tribes’] own cultural, environmental, and economic values and priorities.”

The 1981 meeting featured speakers who continued the message that tribal leaders stood ready to consider serious business proposals. In his opening remarks, Peter MacDonald implored the assembled tribal leaders and corporate officers to demonstrate the power of private investment by turning economically depressed reservations “into new growth zones that would transform the economy, the nation, and the future for us all.” “I encourage you to gamble,” the CERT chairman continued, as “the odds are much better here than at Las Vegas. There is risk—but the risk is far less than the danger we face if we fail to seize the opportunity of the moment.” MacDonald’s call for investment was followed by energy consultants explaining the procedures for doing business in
Indian Country and by testimony from corporate executives already working with tribes extolling the potential for profits. And as if on cue, the keynote speaker at the conference, Houston oilman Michael Halbouty, a close energy advisor to President Reagan and a member of Secretary Watt’s Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation’s Energy Resources, concluded the meeting by telling the audience, “It is about time that the entire business community of the United States realize that it can do business with the Indian tribes.”

This shift by energy tribes toward actively courting private investment was certainly not the first time these groups looked outside the federal government to support their quest for economic self-sufficiency. The tribes had made similarly eager overtures in the 1960s, when energy companies first descended on western reservations looking for low-sulfur coal. This time, however, tribal leaders understood what was needed to make the tribal-private partnership work for both parties. Years of work by CERT and others to educate tribal leaders and provide market and geological data created negotiators well equipped to demand fair royalties. But as Peter MacDonald explained at the 1981 CERT meeting, “Simply bargaining for higher royalty rates is not enough and [the energy tribes] must explore issues involving ownership, management, up-front payments, and differentiation of agreements to authorize development.” The tribes were hungry to strike deals, but this time they understood that the agreements must give Indians an active role in the ensuing ventures.

To ensure the outcome they desired, CERT members concluded their annual meeting with a series of resolutions supporting measures that would give energy tribes the authority to control reservation resource development. In emphatic terms, MacDonald declared these initiatives would inaugurate “the dawning of a new era for [the federal-tribal] relationship: an era of recognition of our right to freedom from the shackles of federal restrictions on our ability to do business, to look after the needs of our people and to shape our own future.” After first demanding that tribes receive the same regulatory status as states in every “federal program that delegates authority,” tribal delegates turned their attention to the ongoing efforts to amend the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act. Clearly, energy tribes supported any action enlarging—or more accurately, recognizing—their sovereign authority over reservation...
resources. But CERT had not been consulted on this important piece of new legislation and the energy tribes wanted a voice in the process. The organization’s lawyers at the Native American Rights Fund opined that tribes “probably” already possessed the legal authority to negotiate alternative agreements, but like Senator Melcher and the Department of the Interior, CERT began drafting its own piece of clarifying legislation. Until its version was considered and its officers consulted, the organization resolved to oppose the other bills. The energy tribes would go it alone, if necessary, working their congressional connections to promote their own legislative proposal.28

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By fall 1981, then, no less than three different versions of legislation to amend the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act were in circulation. While they differed in the details, all shared the goal of clarifying tribal authority to negotiate alternative mineral contracts. The proposals drafted by Senator Melcher and by CERT were similar in that they offered a clear, straightforward authorization for tribes to enter into whatever type of agreement they desired, subject only to the federal government’s subsequent approval. This shared approach provided ground for dialogue between the energy tribes and the senator, dissolving CERT’s opposition to his bill. When the Department of Justice endorsed Melcher’s proposal, finding “no reason to differentiate between lease and non-lease arrangements” in the law, the senator introduced his bill to Congress on November 30, 1981. Rather than supplant the old 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act, however, the proposal left that statute intact to give tribes the option of using competitive bidding procedures and standard lease forms if they so desired. The bill also included a provision retroactively ratifying all previous alternative agreements.29

Energy tribes and their corporate partners quickly rallied to support the proposed legislation. At special on-site hearings held in Billings in February 1982, nine western tribes—including the Northern Cheyenne, Crow, and Navajo—voiced their support for the legislation’s general concepts. They argued again that increased tribal sophistication meant their governments deserved the flexibility to craft deals meeting their specific needs. As Navajo spokesman Gilbert Harrison explained,
In the last decade, the Navajo Nation has upgraded its internal capacity to plan, evaluate and develop various energy projects. No longer is the Navajo Tribe satisfied with the old standard federal leases, which only emphasized and relied on royalty return. New concepts which could be formalized will address alternative forms of agreements keyed to assumption of control and efficient development of its energy resources and these agreements will pay a higher return to the tribe.

Knowledgeable mining companies agreed, noting, as ARCO representative Curtis Burton did, that the days of Indian ignorance in energy negotiations were gone:

Our recent experience in conducting business with representatives of Indian tribes is that the tribes, represented by their elected authorities and by retained experts, bring to the negotiating table a level of sophistication and trading skill that rebuts any alleged need for a status resembling guardianship for the protection of tribal assets.

Witnesses expressed similar sentiments a month later when these hearings continued in Washington, D.C. There, Peabody Coal Company, Amoco, and oil and gas prospector Mission Resources added their names to the list of corporate supporters. Existing law may have treated American Indians as incapable wards, but business people engaged with tribal enterprises understood how inaccurate that perception was.

Not all interested parties, however, supported a bill designed to ease the tribes’ ability to develop reservation resources. Indian allottees formed the most forceful opposition to Melcher’s proposal, arguing the new law would subject them to the same pressures and unbalanced negotiations that had produced inequitable coal leases with tribal governments a decade earlier. Norman Hollow, chairman of the Assiniboin and Sioux tribes on the Fort Peck Reservation, where 90 percent of minerals were owned by individual allottees, distilled their complaints:

The fundamental thing wrong with [the bill] is that it provides the tribes and individual Indians with no protection or advice during the most important time; that is, when the company or its agent is soliciting a lease or contract from the individual Indian. Perhaps most tribes will have the means and will to hire independent consultants. But [Melcher’s bill] leaves the uneducated and uninformed Indian on his own.
Tribal governments may have come a long way in developing the expertise to manage reservation resources, but many believed the same could not be said for individual Indians who happened to own valuable mineral rights.\textsuperscript{31}

This allottee opposition reflected the diversity of Indian experience with mineral development and the differing ownership structures on reservations. But energy tribes had come too far in developing their institutional capacities to allow individual Indians to now derail the expansion of tribal authority. The fix, they proposed, was not to discard the new law but to tie the fate of allottee mineral owners to their presumably better-equipped tribal governments. Melcher’s Senate select committee thus amended the bill to remove allottees’ authority to negotiate their own alternative agreements and give these individuals only the right to join a tribal agreement. As the committee report explained, everyone agreed allottees should receive the same flexibility to develop their minerals as the tribes themselves, but there was no way to ensure they would be adequately prepared and protected. Therefore, since “it is, of course, expected that tribes are in the best position to protect their own members from exploitation,” the committee amended the bill to “retain the Secretary’s authority to approve the inclusion of allottees in a tribe’s negotiated agreement.” For allottees on the Northern Cheyenne, Navajo, Fort Peck, and other reservations whose plans for mineral development differed from their tribal governments, the response to their fears of being exploited must have provided cold comfort.\textsuperscript{32}

With allottee concerns addressed, though perhaps not alleviated, supporters refocused the debate on the proposed legislation’s primary benefit: recognizing tribal authority over reservation resources to match the tribes’ expanded capacity to craft smart energy deals. At the bill’s final hearings, CERT Executive Director Ed Gabriel reiterated that his members were prepared to govern their own minerals and that energy tribes “were no longer content to sit on the sidelines while their resources were being taken from them under unfair terms.” This law, Gabriel argued, was thus “a critical element” for Indian self-determination, not to mention for “all Americans, as our country strives to become more independent of foreign energy resources.” The Department of the Interior concurred, sending letters of support to both the Senate and House
committees explaining that the flexible mineral agreements authorized by the legislation would “provide the vehicle by which tribes can become directly involved in management decisions,” thereby “enabling them to gain management experience and contributing significantly to the goal of self-determination.” Tribal capacity and authority thus formed a mutually constitutive relationship. Increased tribal skills and knowledge justified tribes’ having the authority to strike their own deals and participate in mineral development, and this participation would further increase tribal capacity to effectively manage reservation resources. Capacity without authority, however, thwarted the goals of Indian self-determination.\footnote{33} As Melcher explained on the Senate floor, the new law would provide the flexibility Indians needed to develop their resources, which “should help tribes to become economically self-sufficient and the rest of the Nation to become less dependent upon foreign energy sources.” On the House side, Congressman Bereuter agreed, noting the law “is strongly supported by Indian tribes, the administration, and by companies interested in working with tribes to develop reservation mineral resources. It represents a large and positive step toward the future economic well-being of a large segment of the Nation’s Indian population.”\footnote{34}

With all parties in support, on December 22, 1982, President Reagan signed the bill into law as the Indian Mineral Development Act. The bill’s sponsor, Senator Melcher, hailed the act as an opportunity for tribes “to play an active role as opposed to the passive role permitted under the 1938 Act.” He further explained that “in the last de-
caden, many Indian tribes, under self-determination, have begun to build solid governmental infrastructures, as well as trained management and planning personnel.” The president followed up one month later with his administration’s first, and only, formal statement on Indian policy. In it, Reagan reaffirmed Nixon’s self-determination approach and pledged “to assist tribes in strengthening their governments by removing the federal impediments to tribal self-government and tribal resource development.” The statement announced the transfer of the White House’s Indian affairs personnel from the Office of Public Liaison to the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, thereby recognizing the tribe’s “rightful place among the governments of this nation.” Then, in a clear nod to the recently passed Indian Mineral Development Act, the president noted:

Tribal governments have the responsibility to determine the extent and the methods of developing the tribe’s natural resources. The federal government’s responsibility should not be used to hinder tribes from taking advantage of economic development opportunities. . . . The federal role is to encourage the production of energy in ways consistent with Indian values and priorities. To that end, we have strongly supported the use of creative agreements such as joint ventures and other non-lease agreements for the development of Indian mineral resources.

Almost a half century after the 1938 Leasing Act coded into law paternalistic assumptions of Indians’ inability to manage their affairs, tribes finally secured explicit federal authority to develop reservation resources however they deemed fit.35

The ground for this remarkable expansion of tribal sovereignty was prepared over the previous decade by energy tribes’ coordinated efforts to increase their capacity to responsibly and effectively manage reservation assets. Once adequately prepared, tribal leaders pursued innovative deal structures meant to realize their desire for tribal-controlled development. The Northern Cheyenne were both leaders in and emblematic of this movement. After first confirming ownership over reservation minerals and asserting legal rights to shape regional development, the tribe negotiated a sophisticated oil and gas agreement that promised both revenue from and control over drilling operations. But the deal also forced federal officials to reckon with an outdated and ineffective law that seemed to foreclose the Cheyenne’s and other energy tribes’
chosen path to self-determination. Undeterred, these groups redirected their energies toward changing that law. Working under the pressures of massive federal budget cuts and with a consortium of federal officials and energy executives, energy tribes orchestrated the passage of the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act to provide the legal authority to match the tribes’ recently expanded governing capacity.
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New Era, Similar Results

IRONICALLY, AS FEDERAL policy makers, energy executives, and tribal leaders collectively hailed the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act as a momentous victory for tribal sovereignty, several of those most responsible for its passage were not present to share in the celebration. One month before President Reagan signed the act into law, at the Council of Energy Resource Tribes’ annual meeting in Denver, the organization announced plans to replace its longtime director, Ed Gabriel. A former Federal Energy Administration official, Gabriel had led CERT from the beginning, using his contacts to secure federal support and push through legislative changes that empowered tribal governments. Gabriel had tactfully guided the organization’s evolution from an Indian advisory body for federal policy makers to the polemical “Native American OPEC” and ultimately into a professional association dedicated to improving tribal governance. He was an integral player in CERT’s rapid rise to becoming a formidable national institution capable of empowering tribal leaders and enlarging tribal sovereignty.¹

But Ed Gabriel’s departure signaled a shift within an organization that had come of age. His replacement, David Lester, was the current commissioner of the Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration for Native Americans and could match Gabriel’s understanding of the federal bureaucracy. He also possessed attributes
his predecessor did not. As an enrolled member of the Creek Tribe of Oklahoma, Lester would be CERT’s first Native American director. The move held great symbolic meaning, representing the passage of responsibility and expertise for reservation energy development from federal to Indian hands. Yet David Lester’s hiring was more than just a symbolic act. His unique skill set would shape CERT’s new direction. As commissioner of the Administration for Native Americans, Lester had administered a multimillion-dollar federal grant program to aid social and economic development on reservations. He also was a former economic development specialist for the National Congress of American Indians and former director of the United Indian Development Association. His experience in growing reservation economies replaced Gabriel’s aptitude for lobbying for federal support, and over the next several years, Lester would oversee the closing of CERT’s Washington, D.C., office to focus on providing technical assistance to tribes seeking to develop their resources. With tribal governments now possessing clear legal authority over tribal minerals, energy tribes shifted their attention from the nation’s capital back to the reservations. More than at any time in their history, the tribes were well positioned to capitalize on their vast resources.2

Sadly for these groups, forces beyond their control would thwart the successful execution of their recently clarified authority over reservation development. Not only did Ronald Reagan’s budget cuts inflict financial woes on CERT and its members, but the same president who signed into law the Indian Mineral Development Act also pursued energy and economic policies that made the development of Indian energy, particularly low-sulfur coal, economically nonviable. Reagan accelerated President Carter’s deregulation of oil prices, which produced a temporary surge in domestic oil supplies as producers moved reserves into the unregulated market to take advantage of higher prices. The expected increase in domestic output, however, was matched by an unexpected rise in global exploration and production by non-OPEC countries seeking to capitalize on higher international oil prices following the “energy crisis” of 1979. In the face of higher international prices, OPEC’s discipline broke down, and its members raced to capture the economic windfall. By 1983, OPEC was frantically trying to regain control of global supplies and prices by lowering its production quotas, but the damage was done. The world was flooded with oil, and
the demand required to consume this across-the-board increase failed to materialize. Reagan’s austere fiscal and monetary policies exacerbated a global recession, and conservation measures instituted during the Ford and Carter administrations contributed to an overall decline in energy consumption. With demand waning and production soaring, the “energy crises” of the 1970s turned into the “oil glut” of the mid-1980s.³

Cheap oil collapsed the market for Indian energy just as tribes had secured the authority to develop their minerals. Low-sulfur Indian coal development was particularly hard hit—why buy coal when oil was so cheap? Tribes struggled to find development partners to invest in reservation coal mines, and those that had negotiated potentially lucrative deals now saw the projects shelved. In 1980, for instance, the Crow had secured the nation’s first alternative coal agreement with the Shell Oil Company, but by 1985 Shell had determined that the project was economically infeasible. In a curt letter to the tribal government, the multinational energy firm explained that due “to the current status of the coal market,” it must surrender all rights to Crow coal. The Westmoreland Coal Company had reached a similar conclusion a few years earlier, releasing rights to portions of its Crow coal lease.⁴

Tribes possessing oil and gas deposits faced similar struggles. Many rushed to exercise their newfound flexibility to negotiate energy deals only to find their bargaining position undercut by the oil glut. In these altered economic conditions, the new negotiated contracts began to resemble the old leases. Better-informed tribal leaders were able to secure important concessions like tribal hiring preferences, environmental protection clauses, and fluctuating royalties tied to market prices, but energy companies now refused to give up control over mining operations. With an abundance of oil, developers had little reason to begin new projects in which they could not dictate the pace and scale of development. Without control, tribes remained subject to corporate decisions over whether or not to develop and at what scale. The glutted market meant reduced oil and gas production, and the drilling that did occur produced diminished revenue because royalties were now tied to declining market prices. Tribal revenue from oil and gas development reached its peak of $198 million in 1982, then plummeted by 60 percent over the next four years. The same energy tribes that had successfully increased their governing capacity and altered federal law
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to authorize tribal control of reservation development found mastery over a shifting global energy market to be more elusive.\(^5\)

Ongoing intratribal disputes over whether to pursue development, and on what terms, also continued to challenge energy tribes. The Crow example is again instructive, for after the contentious July 1977 impeachment of Tribal Chairman Patrick Stands Over Bull, the Crow community shuffled through a series of leaders as it debated energy development. In fact, of the five tribal chairmen elected in the twenty years following the first serious coal proposal in 1966, only Edison Real Bird (1966–1972) escaped calls for impeachment. Two leaders, Stands Over Bull (1972–1977) and Donald Stewart (1982–1986), were either forcibly removed from office or had all executive powers stripped by tribal resolution. And in every impeachment episode—each of which mirrored in intensity the debates surrounding Stands Over Bull—the driving argument for removal was the alleged mismanagement of tribal energy resources.\(^6\)

These passionate internal debates both did violence to communal relations and drove away potential energy partners. Firms desiring Crow minerals found the tribe’s constantly changing political landscape confusing and too risky for business. After Stands Over Bull’s impeachment, energy companies pleaded with the Department of the Interior to provide clarity as to which Crow faction held the authority to strike coal deals. Mindful of the new policy of Indian self-determination, however, federal officials responded by refusing to “substitut[e] [their] judgment for that of the tribe’s in an internal dispute of this sort.” Without clarity, several energy firms abandoned development plans, and those that continued to pursue Crow minerals pushed the tribe to restructure its government to provide a more stable negotiating body.\(^7\)

Ultimately, the Crow tribe responded to pressures to develop by, once again, altering its governing structure. In 1980, a new majority disbanded the cautious Coal Authority and authorized the tribal chairman to aggressively pursue development projects. But as indicated by Shell’s and Westmoreland’s surrender of Crow coal rights, market conditions hampered these efforts. Ongoing battles within the tribal council, which still included all adult members of the tribe, also continued to drive away potential investors. By 2001, a frustrated majority had seen enough and took dramatic action to overhaul the entire tribal government structure. The Crow ratified a new constitution that replaced
its hyper-democratic tribal council with a system based on the United States’ model of representative government, including separation of powers and a strong executive branch.\textsuperscript{8}

Finally, with this new governing structure in place and oil prices again skyrocketing due to disruptions in global supply, the Crow negotiated a 2004 agreement with the Westmoreland Coal Company to allow the first commercial coal mining on the reservation. The deal, in fact, merely extended the company’s ongoing operations in the Ceded Strip southward onto the reservation proper. Most years, revenue from this enlarged Absaloka Mine provides two-thirds of the tribal government’s nonfederal budget—more than $20 million in 2010. The mine also employs a 70 percent tribal workforce. The relationship between the Crow and Westmoreland has become so strong that Tribal Chairman Darrin Old Coyote recently affirmed to a congressional subcommittee that “without question, [the Absaloka Mine] is a critical source of jobs, financial support, and domestically produced energy. [Westmoreland] has been the Crow Nation’s most significant private partner over the past 39 years.”\textsuperscript{9}

But on a reservation with 47 percent unemployment and a per capita income less than half the U.S. average ($11,987 to $27,334), coal mining’s benefits still do not reach all tribal members. The tribal government thus continues to explore more development opportunities, largely with the blessing of the tribal majority. Since Westmoreland’s extension, the Crow have granted the mining firm more coal rights in the Ceded Strip and also announced three new energy ventures with other companies on the reservation itself. One of these projects could be the nation’s first mine-mouth, coal-to-liquids gasification plant; the others look to export Crow coal to Asia. Billions of tons of coal and millions of dollars of tribal revenue are once again on the table. Of course, not all are thrilled about the prospect of impending development and some tribal members continue to fear the potential impacts. The tribe will continue to wrestle with these decisions. But while it is too early to judge the effects of these potential projects on the Crow community and landscape, it is clear that a restructured tribal government, informed by decades of energy development experience, possesses the clear legal authority to make the deals.\textsuperscript{10}

With global oil prices remaining relatively high in recent years, the Crow tribe is not alone in using its sovereign authority to once again
explore tribal-led energy projects. On the Navajo Reservation, where the postwar exploitation of tribal minerals began and rampant poverty remains, the tribe has taken a two-step approach to exerting control. First, the community has acted largely in unison to shut down dirty and unwanted projects. Second, some portions of tribe have pushed for tribal-controlled ventures to replace them. In 2005, for instance, the tribal government passed a moratorium on uranium development and, in partnership with the Hopi Tribal Council, withdrew tribal water rights necessary to operate Peabody Coal Company’s Black Mesa Mine. That same year, Indian and non-Indian environmental groups forced the closure of the Mohave Generating Station after the facility failed to install costly pollution control technology. These actions delivered death blows to some of the reservation’s more notorious energy projects, but Navajo energy development was far from dead. Starting in 2003, the Diné Power Authority, a tribal enterprise, pursued plans to build its own coal-fired power plant on the reservation, the Desert Rock Energy Project. This facility was proposed to provide electricity to another ambitious tribal endeavor, the Navajo Transmission Project, which would have provided the infrastructure needed to carry reservation-produced electricity to distant markets. Neither project, however, was realized. Local environmental opposition emerged from the outset and the requisite permits were never obtained.

Undeterred, the Navajo tribal government now has gone back to the infamous mine that began the tribe’s tumultuous experience with commercial coal development. On December 31, 2013, the Navajo Transitional Energy Company, another tribal enterprise, bought the Navajo Mine from the world’s largest mining firm, BHP Billiton. This massive facility—once the planet’s biggest strip mine—had fed coal for over fifty years to the Four Corners Generating Station—one of the country’s dirtiest power plants. Now the Navajo own it. But the community cannot agree on whether this is a good thing. Proponents point to the protection of Navajo jobs and the secure revenue stream gained by continuing to sell coal to the Four Corners plant, which would have likely shut down had Billiton not found an interested buyer to keep the mine open. These supporters also hail the deal as a victory for tribal sovereignty, positioning the tribe to control the future of these coal reserves, whether that be exploring cleaner coal gasification technology or exporting coal to Asian markets. Opponents, of course, question the
sanity of now participating in an industrial process that has brought so much harm to the community. Detractors also fear the environmental liabilities the tribe has inherited and argue that buying a worn-out coal mine to supply an outdated power plant makes little business sense. The arguments on both sides are fair. But these are the dilemmas faced by a sovereign government representing diverse constituencies and attempting to wield its power to participate in a risky global energy industry.12

In the thirty-four years since the Northern Cheyenne negotiated the oil and gas deal with the Atlantic Richfield Company that triggered fundamental changes to federal Indian law, the tribe’s reservation has seen little development. In the early 1980s, ARCO drilled dozens of prospecting wells, but most came up dry. By 1984, the company was forced to walk away, leaving behind unreclaimed drill sites and a community becoming more, not less, impoverished. Two years after ARCO shuttered its operations, reservation unemployment reached 60 percent—up from 34 percent in 1979. It has remained there ever since. According to the 2000 census, the per capita income was only $7,247, and more than 50 percent of the population was mired below the poverty line. No doubt, the Northern Cheyenne’s 1970s actions allowed the tribe to maintain control of its resources and protect the reservation. That place is still the Cheyenne homeland, free of the non-Indian interlopers tribal members worried so much about. But it is also free of desperately needed economic development.13

Further, the Northern Cheyenne’s success in keeping its land a distinctly tribal space has not protected the community from the pernicious influences of the outside world. Today, the reservation is completely encircled by coal development. A dozen miles to the north, the Colstrip Power Plant continues to burn coal extracted from a massive adjacent strip mine. On the eastern border, Arch Coal, Inc., the nation’s second largest coal company, is developing the vast Otter Creek Tracts, which span more than 8,000 acres and are estimated to hold over 1,200 million tons of coal. Twenty-five miles to the south, several strip mines operate in the vicinity of Decker, Montana, and the reservation’s western boundary is flanked by the Crow Reservation and its impending development. Testifying to Congress in 2014, Tribal President Llewando Fisher complained that the surrounding activity puts constant pressure on the Northern Cheyenne’s inadequate public services and
facilities and “produces major influxes of newcomers to the area [that] leads to undesirable socio-economic effects on the Tribe, including on-reservation crime, traffic, and accidents.” But the tribe reaps none of the financial rewards that would help combat coal mining’s ill effects. As Fisher explained, “We suffer the impacts of development but receive no revenues that would allow us to minimize the ills inflicted by this development.”

For this reason, the Northern Cheyenne—the tribe that halted the exploitation of tribal energy resources and was labeled as the anti-development tribe—will soon vote on whether to pursue reservation coal mining once again. Already once, in 2006, a tribal referendum directed the tribal government to do just that. Intervening elections, however, have placed a succession of alternating pro- and antidevelopment leaders in the tribe’s highest office. The community is clearly divided on the issue. On February 13, 2014, President Fisher, once a coal mining opponent, asked for clarity. Explaining that “the bleak financial future facing our nation” had persuaded him to now personally prefer development, Fisher announced that he would nevertheless “let the people decide.” “We may not all agree,” he warned, “but we’ll let the majority decide . . . [and] if the Northern Cheyenne vote yes by a majority for coal development on our reservation, we will go strongly in that direction.” Considering the mountains of coal underlying the Cheyenne Reservation and the tribe’s historical importance to Indian energy development nationally, federal officials, energy executives, and other tribal leaders look on anxiously as the tribe deliberates its decision.

In each of these cases of potential reservation development, the debates over tribal survival continue. The infighting is particularly intense when changes to tribal governing practices are proposed to facilitate energy development, as they often are. Some Indians hail the creation of tribal enterprises or new governing committees endowed with the authority to dispense tribal property as necessary improvements to tribal governance. Employing modern and efficient management techniques, they argue, will help the tribes conduct business and alleviate poverty. Others deride the new governing methods as an affront to traditional tribal practices and a threat to the continued existence of the tribe. Of course, the labels of “modern” and “traditional” forms of governance are deeply problematic. Both assume the authenticity of a particular governing structure and then argue that exterior forces either demand
change or require its preservation. The labels are, in essence, ahistorical. But the point here is that the battles over resource development, tribal governance, and indigenous identities continued unabated after energy tribes secured authority to control development. Changing the law to recognize tribal sovereignty was an incredible victory; taking back control over reservation development saved the tribe. But this victory was not the end of the struggle to capitalize on reservation resources. Tribal communities remain subject to the same national and global pressures that first brought energy companies to their doorstep. For that matter, so do indigenous peoples worldwide. Here in the United States, these communities sometimes have been able align the desires of the tribal majority with market forces and reap mining revenues. More often, they have not. Their responses to these forces, however, continue to shape their communities, their landscapes, and the tribal governments that patrol both.\textsuperscript{16}

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In yet another example of the inner turmoil that often accompanies tribal energy development, CERT’s 1982 annual conference not only witnessed the departure of Executive Director Ed Gabriel, but it also marked the last meeting for CERT and Navajo Tribal Chairman Peter MacDonald. Just two weeks before the Denver gathering, the Navajo Nation voted MacDonald out of office in favor of Peterson Zah, the head of the DNA People’s Legal Services, which represented individual Navajos fighting energy projects often supported by MacDonald’s administration. Zah’s position with DNA had given him a political base to attack MacDonald’s pro-development policies, and MacDonald’s defeat meant the longstanding chairman could no longer serve as CERT’s leader. At exactly the moment energy tribes secured authority to develop their own minerals, CERT was faced with replacing its entire leadership team.\textsuperscript{17}

Like its new director, David Lester, CERT’s new chairman, Wilfred Scott, brought a different perspective to Indian energy development. Scott’s Nez Perce tribe did not possess substantial hydrocarbons and showed little appetite for pursuing large-scale energy projects. In fact, the Nez Perce had recently rejected a hydroelectric facility due to potential harm to its tribal fishery. In addition to this different perspective,
Scott also brought a different leadership style, replacing MacDonald’s combative bluster with a conciliatory approach that cultivated cooperative relationships between member tribes, CERT officials, and federal agencies. The new leadership tandem of Scott and Lester continued to advocate for tribal control of mining projects and made available CERT’s consulting services to tribes desiring development. But in contrast to their predecessors, they did not push mineral development as a panacea for tribal problems. More wary of the potential social and environmental impacts of development, CERT’s leaders counseled tribal governments to take calculated approaches to reservation development that considered their preparedness to manage potential projects and their community’s support for them.  

The difficult market conditions of the 1980s also meant there was little upside to pushing hard for development until tribes were ready to manage and support it. In the interim, energy tribes focused on improving their capacity to regulate mining and consolidated legal authority over tribal resources. CERT continued to provide technical assistance to help tribes determine their resource inventories, improve accounting systems to better track royalties, and, with the increasing support of the Environmental Protection Agency, monitor environmental impacts of existing development.

To match this continued growth in capacity, the tribes pushed through a series of new federal laws designed to further extend tribal control over reservation development. The 1992 Indian Energy Resources Act directed the Department of the Interior to help tribes develop a “vertically integrated energy industry on Indian reservations,” and the 2003 Energy Policy Act provided grants and technical assistance to achieve this end. Tribal control over energy development reached its legal apogee in 2005 with the passage of the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, which authorized tribes to completely forego federal approval of development projects once they had established a “tribal energy resource agreement” (TERA). Serving as “master agreements” between individual tribes and the federal government, TERAs must include adequate procedures for constructing tribal energy deals, provisions related to the tribe’s economic return, lists of all tribal laws governing reservation mining, and assurances of the tribe’s capacity to monitor and manage environmental and social impacts. Once a TERA is approved, a tribe has complete regulatory author-
ity over reservation energy development, from contract negotiations to enforcement of the deal’s terms. Critics argue that TERAs remove important federal protections for tribal lands—such as the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act—but these agreements represent the fullest manifestation yet of Indian self-determination. Such autonomy has always come with risks, as well as benefits.

The significant change in CERT’s leadership that accompanied the passage of the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act thus ushered in a new era in the tribes’ approach to energy development. New leaders counseled a more measured, though still active, pursuit of development, and energy tribes continued to expand their knowledge of and sovereignty over reservation resources. Distant market forces and intratribal turmoil, however, stifled potential projects, leaving the end results, for now, largely unchanged. Energy tribes continue to wait for the day when they can capitalize on their valuable minerals, which they now possess the capacity and authority to do.

Beyond ushering in a new era in Indian energy development, the 1982 changeover in CERT’s leadership also provided an opportunity to reflect on how far the tribes had come. Seizing the moment, outgoing chairman Peter MacDonald delivered a farewell address at CERT’s annual meeting that recounted the entire history of the organization he helped create. The flamboyant leader did not disappoint. Applying a Star Trek metaphor to characterize CERT’s voyage as a long-imperiled mission with little hope of success, MacDonald began by listing the many challenges facing “Starship CERT” at its outset. These included the energy tribes’ immense diversity, their lack of geological and market data, and the resistance of federal agencies to relinquish control over Indian resources. He also noted the universal hostility created “just by dubbing ourselves the ‘Native American OPEC’” and the criticism CERT received from some American Indians when it obtained “the thing that we feared most . . . a federal grant, and not just one federal grant, but numerous federal grants.” The early days of CERT, the chairman recalled, were characterized by confusion over its mission, the ignorance of its members, and the reluctance of federal officials to faithfully carry out their trustee duty.

But the message MacDonald hoped most to convey was that despite these long odds, CERT survived in the same way American Indians had
survived since European contact, by adapting to constantly changing
circumstances. In his words, the organization “evolved from a means
to increase bargaining leverage to an end in itself—a forum for giving
tribes power in national politics.” Now that CERT and its allies had
exercised their power to change federal law and clarify the tribes’ ex-
pansive sovereignty, MacDonald predicted:

CERT will become a symbol for the next voyage of the human spe-
cies—a voyage to a post-industrial world. It is a voyage which Native
Americans are uniquely equipped to make. . . . We retain our traditions,
our sense of community, and the medicine bundles of sacred soil, brought
from previous worlds and preserved to enable us to achieve harmony in
a new world, yet unknown. . . . Spaceship CERT is ready for its next five-
year voyage—ready to create the think tanks, the social experiments, the
new institutions, and the new linkages for our peoples, the First Ameri-
cans. We are equipped by long tradition and practice to adapt, adjust,
and yet survive with our identity miraculously preserved.22

MacDonald’s last point was the most important to American Indians.
The onslaught of demand for tribal resources had brought the world’s
largest energy firms to reservation borders, where a flawed legal regime
invited them in. Proposed mining not only imperiled reservation land-
scapes, but it threatened to erase established customs and norms that
defined the communities living there. Yet, as alluded to by MacDonald,
the energy tribes survived with their identities intact. Belying percep-
tions encoded in federal law that American Indians were incapable
wards, these tribes mobilized a defense of their homeland and de-
veloped the institutional capacity to regulate industrial activities within
that land. Based on this increased capacity, the 1982 Indian Mineral
Development Act recognized tribal authority to direct reservation de-
velopment, which subsequent laws strengthened. Now equipped with
the legal authority to pursue development in line with their communi-
ties’ desires, only the successful execution of that power is left unfin-
ished. The fact that external, often global, structures continue to limit
the exercise of this sovereignty—while internal debates rage over how
to respond to these pressures—does not diminish the energy tribes’ ac-
complishments. Rather, it makes them historical actors like any other,
operating among forces they can shape but not fully control.
Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. “Proceedings of the Native American, Environmentalist, and Agriculturalist Workshop” (Northern Rockies Action Group, December 10, 1975), 15, in author’s possession.

2. 31 U.S. 515 (1832), 559. A staunch federalist, Marshall limited his defense of tribal sovereignty to internal tribal matters within tribal lands, maintaining that the federal government held superior authority over the tribes’ external relations. In fact, he followed the quote about Indian nations being distinct and independent with the words “with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power” of a conquering nation. This recognition of federal supremacy, however, does not affect Marshall’s legal opinion that tribes retained the right to manage resources within their lands. As to Jackson’s quotes, see Felix S. Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Newark: LexisNexis, 2005), 50, n. 304; Ronald N. Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974), 49, n. 31; Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 212, n. 61. Most historians agree on the accuracy of Jackson’s quote, though the more popular version holds that the president replied, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” Regardless of his actual words, subsequent federal actions made clear Jackson’s policy to ignore the Supreme Court’s holding. Finally, the literature on non-Indians divesting Indians of their land and resources in the nineteenth century is voluminous. Francis Paul Prucha provides the classic introduction to the many ways in which this was accomplished (Prucha, Great Father). For the more specific point of how non-Indians used the legal system


5. As I discuss in chapter 1, Felix Cohen’s position stemmed from his normative vision of America as a legally pluralistic society with power decentralized to local authorities. For Cohen’s concept of legal pluralism and his efforts to apply it to American Indian law, see Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, *Architect of Justice: Felix S. Cohen and the Founding of American Legal Pluralism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). For additional explanations of Cohen’s approach to Indian law, particularly


8. My notion of a “third area of sovereignty” is related to, but different from, Kevin Bruyneel’s concept of a “third space of sovereignty.” In *The Third Space of Sovereignty*, Bruyneel demonstrates how Euro-American legal institutions and cultural constructions continuously limited American Indians both to a place outside the American polity (spatial boundary) and to a time before the emergence of a modern American state (temporal boundary). However, while careful to note these limitations, Bruyneel also finds ambiguity in the application of these principles, stemming largely from the multifaceted nature of the American people and its state. The lack of uniformity in views and policies toward American Indians produces what Bruyneel calls “colonial ambivalence,” creating a space within which American Indians could operate historically to exercise some sovereignty and extract benefits from the federal government. It is here, in this “third space of sovereignty,” where American Indians are neither wholly within nor outside the American state, that Bruyneel finds Indian agency and the explanation for the continued resiliency of American Indian groups today. Kevin Bruyneel, *The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of U.S.–Indigenous Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 1–25. While greatly influenced by Bruyneel’s work, my use of the “third area of sovereignty” is less amorphous and stands simply for that area within federal jurisprudence where tribal governments, rather than federal or state governments, maintain primary authority.


11. Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world systems theory” provides the most influential analysis of these core-periphery relations. For a cogent summary of this theory, see Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). Representative examples of environmental histories that apply the theory to international development in the modern era include Richard P. Tucker, *Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecologi-

12. A major exception to the statement that environmental histories have tended not to follow the trajectory of impacts outward from the periphery is Richard Grove’s work, Green Imperialism. In it, Grove demonstrates how the incorporation of local knowledge of the natural world, generated in colonial peripheries, influenced scientific knowledge in the metropoles, leading ultimately to powerful scientific critiques of colonialism. Richard Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600–1860 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).


PROLOGUE


3. The few existing studies of Indian energy development generally portray tribal leaders as passive observers to a BIA-controlled system of exploitation. See Toole, Rape of the Great Plains; Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds; Donald Fixico, The Invasion of Indian Country in the Twentieth Century American Capitalism and Tribal Natural Resources (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1998); and Charles F Wilkinson, Fire on the Plateau: Conflict and Endurance in the American Southwest (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999). A recent collection of essays, however, demonstrates how “from the beginning of energy development on Indian lands, Indian people have been actively engaged: as owners and lessees of resources, workers in the industries, consumers of electricity and gasoline, and developers of tribal energy companies, as well as environmentalists who sometimes challenge these enterprises.” Sherry L. Smith and Brian Frehner, eds., Indians and Energy: Exploitation and Opportunity in the American Southwest (Santa Fe: SAR Press, 2010), 5. This work follows in the latter mold, explaining how through active engagement in energy development projects, tribal governments gained the knowledge and legal tools necessary to manage their own resources.

CHAPTER 1. THE TRIBAL LEASING REGIME


2. Ibid. To be clear, a small coal mine already existed on the reservation by the time Krueger submitted his proposal. This mine, however, supplied heating coal to reservation residents and did not export coal off reservation for industrial uses. Krueger’s offer was the first proposal to develop Cheyenne coal in commercial quantities to be used for the industrial production of electricity. For the response from Billings BIA officials, see Ned O. Thompson, memo, January 7, 1966 (found in Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-1 to A-2).

3. The quote describing the trustee duty as a cornerstone of Indian law comes from Dept. of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Prot. Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2001). In that opinion, the court merely affirmed the description of this duty as it appeared in Felix S. Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2005 ed. (Newark: LexisNexis, 2005), 221. For further description of this trustee duty being akin to the common law duty of any fiduciary to responsibly manage a trust corpus for beneficiaries, see United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). John Marshall first acknowledged the United States’ superior title to Indian lands in Johnson v. M’Intosh, reasoning the country’s “discovery and conquest” of a new but inhabited land provided this right. Although he characterized the federal claim as an “absolute ultimate title,” Marshall also admitted that Indians still possessed
the “legal as well as just” right of occupancy, which granted them certain sovereign rights within that territory. 21 U.S. 543, 592, 574 (1823). Later, in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, Marshall elaborated that this unique indigenous land right did not create full sovereign Indian nations within the territory of the United States but instead made the tribes “domestic dependent nations . . . in a state of pupilage,” likening their relationship to the United States as “that of a ward to his guardian.” 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). This special status of Indian nations as “domestic dependent nations” forms the basis the United States’ trustee duty to responsibly manage Indian land and resources. The last quote holding the federal government to the most exacting fiduciary standards comes from *Seminole Nation v. United States*, 187 U.S. 286, 297 (1912); see also Cohen, *Handbook of Federal Indian Law*, 2005 ed., 419–20, and Christian McMillen, *Making Indian Law: The Hualapai Land Case and the Birth of Ethnohistory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 89–90.


5. Act of July 22, 1790, Public Law 1–33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). The 1790 Non-Intercourse Act specifically prohibited the transfer of Indian land unless “duly executed at some public treaty, under the authority of the United States.” As to major shifts in federal Indian policy, their justifications, and the impact on Indian land holdings, see notes 3–5 to introduction, above, and accompanying text.

6. As to John Collier’s Indian New Deal, see generally notes 4–5 to introduction, above, and accompanying text.


8. For Collier’s views on indirect administration, see Rusco, *Fateful Time*, 160–63 and 176. For a discussion of how, in practice, BIA’s “technical assistance” could often preempt tribal decision making, see Thomas Biolsi, *Organizing the

9. Initially, two young attorneys, Cohen and Melvin Siegel, worked on the draft legislation. Little is known of Siegel, but Elmer Rusco reports that Lucy Cohen, Felix’s wife, remembers Siegel remaining at the Department of the Interior for only a few months, and thus he could not have been a major contributor to Indian policy debates. Rusco, Fateful Time, 193. For the quotes describing Cohen’s views on legal pluralism, see Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Architect of Justice: Felix S. Cohen and the Founding of American Legal Pluralism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 57.

10. Mitchell, Architect of Justice, 82–90. The original bill’s quotes are taken from ibid., at 83. It should be noted that Felix Cohen strongly opposed the BIA’s position that the Indian Reorganization Act authorized only the federal government to issue corporate charters to Indian tribes. Cohen’s stance, consistent with the argument he would make throughout his tenure, was that the right to incorporate was a fundamental right of any sovereign power. Because Congress had not explicitly extinguished this right for Indian tribes, they thus retained the authority to define their own powers through corporate charters. Felix Cohen to Frederic Kirgis, April 14, 1937, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter NAI), RG 48, entry 809, box 12.

of tribal powers down to three it unwittingly expanded tribal sovereignty. They reason that although Interior’s proposal included a long list of potential powers, these powers had to first be granted by the federal government in the form of a corporate charter tailor-made to the specific situation of each tribe. The final IRA, however, granted these three enumerated powers to any tribe organized under the statute, not to mention recognizing “all powers vested . . . by existing law.” Thus, in the final law, although the BIA retained the right to approve tribes’ organizing constitutions, once accepted it could not deny these powers. Deloria and Lytle, Nations Within, 142.

12. This premise of Indian powers mirrors the first principle Cohen would later articulate in his seminal work, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2005 ed., 2. (“ Nonetheless, there are some fundamental principles that underlie the entire field of federal Indian law. First, an Indian nation possesses in the first instance all of the powers of a sovereign state.” Emphasis removed.) As to the debates within Interior, the Solicitor’s Office itself was also divided over the proper interpretation of tribal powers. Within that office, the most prominent members of the divided camps were Assistant Solicitor Frederick Wiener and William Flannery, who invariably offered legal interpretations limiting tribal powers and affirming BIA’s oversight role, versus Cohen, Solicitor Nathan Margold, and Charlotte Westwood, who offered consistently expansive interpretations of tribal sovereignty. On resolving inconsistencies between the Northern Cheyenne constitution and Interior’s regulations relating to grazing leases, see William Flannery, memorandum to file, February 27, 1936, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 9; and Felix Cohen, memorandum to file, March 6, 1936, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 9. On disagreements over whether tribal governments can issue timber contracts, mineral leases, or agricultural leases to Indian cooperatives at a nominal sum, see William Flannery, memorandum to file, October 22, 1936, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 11; and William Flannery to Frederick Wiener, November 14, 1936, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 11. On whether a conflict of interest justifies the BIA’s denial of a timber contract entered into by the Flathead Indians, see William Flannery to Frederick Wiener, December 1, 1936, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 11; and Charlotte Westwood to Frederick Wiener, December 1, 1936, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 9. On a dispute over whether the Paiute Indians of the Pyramid Lake Reservation can veto a mineral lease issued prior to the tribe’s organization under the IRA, see Frederick Wiener to Nathan Margold, March 6, 1937, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 12; and unsigned memo to Assistant Secretary of the Interior, March 9, 1937, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 12.

13. The National Archives does not contain a copy of the BIA’s initial proposal to streamline the process for developing Indian minerals, but it is referenced at Charles Fahy to the Geological Survey, August 8, 1933, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 2. No further action appears to have been taken on this proposal until 1935, when Felix Cohen drafted a memo on behalf of Solicitor Nathan Margold detailing the impacts of the proposed legislation. Nathan Margold to John Collier, February 6, 1935, NAI, RG 48, entry 809, box 6.

14. Cohen’s “fiery retort” that was later amended to soften its tone can be found at Nathan Margold to John Collier, January 24, 1935, NAI, RG 48, entry 809,
box 6 (draft memorandum authored by Felix Cohen). Assistant Solicitor Rufus Poole’s memo questioning the Solicitor’s Office’s role is at Assistant Solicitor Poole to Nathan Margold, January 28, 1935, NAII, RG 48, entry 809, box 6. Finally, as to Cohen’s amendments, compare Nathan Margold to John Collier (draft memorandum authored by Felix Cohen), January 24, 1935, NAII, RG 48, entry 809, box 6 with Nathan Margold to John Collier, February 6, 1935, NAII, RG 48, entry 809, box 6. Cohen wrote in the margins of both the original draft and the memo from Poole, “revised as to form.”

15. The final bill, along with Senate and House reports, can be found at S. 2638, H.R. 7681, 74th Cong. (1935). It is interesting to note the statutory language governing the secretary’s veto authority is different for oil and gas leases than for other minerals. With respect to oil and gas, the final statute specified the secretary could reject bids for development “whenever in his judgment the interest of the Indians will be served by so doing.” With other minerals, the statute authorized tribes to lease their interests only “with the approval of the Secretary of Interior.” Compare 25 U.S.C. § 396(b) with § 396(a) (2006). For Interior’s position that the 1938 IMLA controlled all transfers of Indian minerals, see Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Permitting Indian Tribes to Enter into Certain Agreements for the Disposition of Tribal Mineral Resources and for Other Purposes, 97th Cong., 2d sess., June 10, 1982, 8–12; House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Permitting Indian Tribes to Enter into Certain Agreements for the Disposition of Tribal Mineral Resources and for Other Purposes, 97th Cong., 2d sess., August 13, 1982, 9–13; and Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs on S. 1894, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, 70–77.


22. The 1938 act’s public bidding requirement for oil and gas is at 25 U.S.C. § 396b (2006). Nowhere in the act does it require bidding for minerals other than oil and gas, yet the controlling regulations requiring that all Indian minerals be “advertised for bids” are at 25 C.F.R. § 171.2 (1966).

23. The tribal resolution is at Northern Cheyenne Tribal Resolution No. 9 (66), February 10, 1966 (found in Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition, A-1 to A-2”). Thompson’s communication to BIA headquarters is located at Ned O. Thompson to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, April 2, 1966, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332, box 21, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC. It is also described at Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-3; and Toole, Rape of the Great Plains, 62.

24. The fixed royalty rate was provided in Charles Corke to James Canan, March 15, 1966 (found in Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-4).

25. Interior put in place an acreage limit for Indian coal leases to prevent mining firms from securing a mineral development monopoly on any given reservation. The limitation, however, could be waived if a “larger acreage is in the interest of the [tribe] and is necessary to permit the establishment or construction of a thermal electric power plant or other industrial facilities on or near the reservation.” 25 C.F.R. 171.9(b). For the rationale behind the acreage limitation, see Myron E. Saltmarsh, “Acting Area Realty Officer to Area Director,” March 12, 1974, K. Ross Toole Papers, series V, box 28, folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana. Washington officials actually authorized such a waiver for Northern Cheyenne development on numerous occasions. Fryer to James F. Canan, May 11, 1966, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332, box 21, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC; and Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-3. For further description of the acreage limit waiver and the reduction in royalties for coal burned on reservation, see Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-4 to A-9.

26. The life of John Woodenlegs’s famed grandfather is detailed in Wooden Leg and Thomas Bailey Marquis, Wooden Leg: A Warrior Who Fought Custer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962). Both the Lincoln Star’s editorial and Woodenleg’s reply (“From the President”) were reprinted in the March 18, 1966, edition of the Northern Cheyenne newsletter, the Morning Star News (in author’s possession). For Metcalf’s introduction of Woodenleg’s letter on the Senate floor, see Progress on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, 89th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record (February 21, 1966): S3391–92. Jim Canan describes his meeting with John Woodenlegs and reservation superintendent John Artichoker at the Billings, Montana, Northern Hotel to hear their strong support for coal development. Fisher, “Transcript of Notes of Conversation with J. Canan of the BIA Regarding
the Northern Cheyenne Petition,” 2. Thompson’s additional request for immediate action on the Cheyenne coal auction is found at Ned O. Thompson to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 6, 1966, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332, box 21, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC. For a general description of Cheyenne actions to move along the process, from the Cheyenne’s own attorneys, see Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-5.


CHAPTER 2. POSTWAR ENERGY DEMANDS AND THE SOUTHWESTERN EXPERIENCE


2. As to the post–World War II deals that brought Middle Eastern oil to the world, see ibid., chapter 21. For the broad societal impacts of cheap oil, see ibid., 541–60; and Rudi Volti, Cars and Culture: The Life Story of a Technology (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 105–13.


6. The figure noting that 80 percent of western coal underlies federal or tribal land comes from Cannon and Haley, *Leased and Lost*, 2. For more detailed description of the existing legal regime, and the wasteful practices it replaced, see, above, chapter 1, notes 17–18 and accompanying text.


9. Ibid., 4–6. As to coal lease concentration among large oil companies, see ibid., 9–11.

10. The quotes from both the General Accounting Office and the Council for Economic Priorities are found at Canon and Haley, *Leased and Lost*, 22.


14. Oil, gas, and uranium figures can be found in Comptroller General of the United States, Indian Natural Resources: Part 2, Coal, Oil, and Gas, 1–2; Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Mineral Leasing on Indian Lands, 8; and Marjane Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds: Indian Control of Energy Development (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 94, n. 8. The Harris quote is found in Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds, 94.


25. Ibid., chapter 5. Morton blames the suboptimal leases on an overriding federal policy to develop the nation's coal at all cost. I question whether he confuses
policy goals with executive agency actions, as a close reading of his analysis reveals that federal agents simply failed to uphold the intent of mineral leasing legislation, which was to thoughtfully and systematically develop the nation’s resources so as to avoid waste, prevent monopolies, and regulate mining in the public interest. For Morton, this failure to perform indicates that the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act and the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act did not substantially alter nineteenth-century policies that encouraged, and failed to regulate, private exploitation of public and Indian resources. My view is different, as these Progressive reforms were intended to curtail many of the excesses of Gilded Age mining, but the federal agencies tasked with carrying out these directives simply were not provided the tools and resources for doing so. Still, we both arrive at the same conclusion: that the federal regime failed to efficiently develop western resources for the good of public and Indian owners. See Morton, “Coal Leasing in the Fourth World,” chapter 7.


32. Redhouse, Geopolitics of the Navajo Hopi Land Dispute, 16. The Peabody permit revoked by the tribal council was designed to provide coal to the proposed Mohave Generating Station, owned by the WEST-affiliated Southern California Edison Company.

34. Iverson, *Navajo Nation*, 105.
35. For environmental opposition to Grand Canyon dams and thus need to construct the Navajo Generating Station, see Needham, “Power Lines,” chapter 7.
36. Wilkinson, *Blood Struggle*, 303–4; Josephy, “Murder of the Southwest,” 62–64; and Redhouse, *Geopolitics of the Navajo Hopi Land Dispute*, 18–22. In 1948, the states of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona signed the Colorado River Compact to allocate water rights to this valuable western water source. Arizona received 50,000 acre-feet, but no provision was made for Navajo rights even though the majority of state land adjoining the river was on the reservation. Although these specific Navajo water rights had not been determined, the 1908 Supreme Court *Winters v. United States* decision held that the creation of Indian reservations implied a reserved right to the water flowing through or adjacent to them in order to fulfill the purpose of the reservation system, which was to provide a self-sufficient homeland to transform Indians from “wild” hunters and gatherers to “civilized” agricultural and pastoral people. 207 U.S. 564 (1908); and Cohen, *Federal Indian Law*, § 19.02 (2005). Under the *Winters* doctrine, the Navajo thus had a strong legal claim to a majority of Arizona’s allocated Colorado River water. The deal orchestrated by the Department of the Interior and WEST, however, required the Navajo to give up this legal claim to 34,100 acre-feet of water, plus an additional 3,000 acre-feet for the town of Page, Arizona, where the Navajo Generating Station would be built.
40. For Peter MacDonald’s efforts to tap into rising nationalist sentiment among younger Navajo and his actions to control, not suspend, energy development, see Needham, “Power Lines,” 309–39; and Andrew Needham, “A Piece of the
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41. Andrew Needham is especially helpful in understanding MacDonald’s new approach to reservation development. As he explains, “By the time the tribe began questioning the electrical development on their land, most of the projects needed to generate electricity—strip mines, railroads, slurry pipes, power plants, and transmission lines—were already in place. As fixed capital, this geography resisted change imposed from the outside, leading Navajos to pursue regulatory instead of transformative change.” Needham, “Power Lines,” 261.

Chapter 3. “The Best Situation in Their History”


2. Ibid., 5; and James S. Cannon and Mary Jean Haley, Leased and Lost: A Study of Public and Indian Coal Leasing in the West (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1974), 31. To reiterate, these lease acreages represented only a tiny fraction of Indian lands actually opened to energy companies because the prospecting permits that led to leases gave mining firms access to much larger areas of the reservation to drill and explore. Once locating particularly desirable deposits, the coal companies then held exclusive rights to convert the large prospecting permit into a smaller lease, which authorized the actual removal of coal. As we will see in chapters 4 and 5, for American Indians, the presence of outside energy developers scouring their reservations for precious minerals was often as disturbing as the actual mining activities.

3. The lease royalty figures come from Cannon and Haley, Leased and Lost, 4; and Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Mineral Leasing on Indian Lands, 83–84. The Montana coal excise tax is discussed at K. Ross Toole, The Rape of the Great Plains: Northwest America, Cattle and Coal (Boston: Little, Brown 1976), 62–64. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found Montana’s taxation of tribal mineral revenues to be an unlawful infringement on tribal sovereignty. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court later clarified, however, that Montana’s excise tax was unlawful not because states lacked the authority to tax non-Indian development of reservation resources but because Montana’s tax was “extraordinarily high” and unfairly discriminated against the tribe’s ability to market their coal. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186–87, n. 17 (1989); for further clarification see also Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696, 715 (1998) (“Montana, Cotton Petroleum thus indicates, had the power to tax Crow coal, but not at an exorbitant rate.”). The Supreme Court thus left open the possibility of states imposing reasonable taxes on non-Indian operators extracting minerals from Indian reservations.


6. Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-11 to A-14. The first document that directly discusses Peabody’s takeover of Sentry’s interests is a May 18, 1967, letter from the coal company’s attorneys to the BIA’s Northern Cheyenne office. But several other documents make it clear that discussions for this takeover were ongoing between Peabody and the Northern Cheyenne since the end of 1966. For instance, on December 17, 1966, Tribal President John Woodenlegs told President Lyndon Johnson’s National Advisory Committee on Rural Poverty that his tribe had recently “advertised for coal prospecting, resulting in a very hopeful negotiation with the largest coal mining company in America.” Similarly, early in 1967, Peabody Vice President Richard Miller wrote Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana to thank him and fellow Montana Senator Mike Mansfield, for their “offer to assist us with federal departments and agencies that may be helpful in the development of [Northern Cheyenne coal].” Metcalf’s subsequent correspondence makes clear that the parties involved understood that Peabody’s goals included the construction of a power plant on or near the reservation. John Woodenlegs, “Statement Presented to President’s Johnson’s National Advisory Committee on Rural Poverty,” December 17, 1966, Lee Metcalf Papers, General Correspondence, Collection No. 172, box 237, folder 237–1, Montana Historical Society, Digital Library and Archives; Richard Miller to Lee Metcalf, February 15, 1967, Lee Metcalf Papers, General Correspondence, Collection No. 172, box 237, folder 237–1, Montana Historical Society, Digital Library and Archives; Lee Metcalf to Oakley Coffee, February 25, 1967, Lee Metcalf Papers, General Correspondence, Collection No. 172, box 237, folder 237–1, Montana Historical Society, Digital Library and Archives. The Northern Cheyenne’s approval of the permit expansion is found at John Woodenlegs, “Resolution No. 70 (67),” October 16, 1967, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332, box 21, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC. John White’s quote is found in Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-20.

7. James Canan to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 9, 1967, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332, box 21, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC; Charles Corke to James Canan, November 16, 1967, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332,
8. John R. White to Area Office Realty Files, 3. For a thorough description of the Peabody extension negotiations, see Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-14 to A-23.

9. For the tribal council taking the initiative to offer more land for mining and Rowlan’s leadership in opening the entire reservation, see John R. White to Area Office Realty Files, 4. (“It is my belief that no one in the Bureau up to that point [of the Northern Cheyenne resolution] had suggested that another coal sale be held.”) The actual tribal resolution authorizing the reservation-wide lease sale is found at John Woodenlegs, “Resolution No. 37 (68),” April 22, 1968, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332, box 21, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC.


13. As to Peabody pressure, see “Northern Cheyenne Highlights, Calendar Year 1969,” 1–2; and Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-30 to A-31, A-82. At the same meeting where the tribal council considered Peabody’s second bid, company executive J. H. Hobbs announced that his firm planned to exercise the lease option on its first permit and extract coal, but only if the tribe allowed Peabody to construct a railroad line to the coal fields. No doubt the implied assertion was that Peabody’s willingness to continue the entire project also hung on the council approving Peabody’s second bid. Tribal council actions to accept Peabody’s second bid, issue a lease on the first coal permit, and negotiate for transportation infrastructure across the reservation can be found at Northern Cheyenne Tribal Resolution No. 20 (70), August 18, 1969 (found in Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-81); Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council Resolution No. 10 (71), July 20, 1970 (found in Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-35); and Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council Resolution No. 24 (70), August 31, 1970 (found in Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-43).

14. W. H. Oestreicher to Allen Rowland, June 1, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332, box 21, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC. For tribal council efforts to renegotiate royalty terms, see Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-38 to A-44. The original August 1970 deal terms included minimum royalty payments that would commence in the third year of the contract to insure Peabody actively pursued production rather than simply sitting on the coal deposits until the market improved. The tribal council successfully negotiated an increase in these minimum royalty terms and secured a promise from Peabody to start paying them in the contract’s first, not third, year. The BIA official assisting the tribe in these negotiations was Donald Maynard, and his quote regarding immediate tribal needs is found at Donald Maynard to Acting
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Director, Economic Development, September 28, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Northern Cheyenne, decimal #332, box 21, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC. There were also numerous other incidents where the Northern Cheyenne pushed back against Peabody and demanded amendments to their existing contracts, with the BIA's blessing. For instance, when Peabody's second permit came up for renewal in fall 1971 and it became clear the coal company needed Cheyenne water to fully develop the coal resources, the two sides hammered out an agreement where the tribe promised certain water rights in exchange for more advanced royalties. Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-50 to A-55, A-84 to A-87. The new BIA superintendent Alonzo Spang—himself, an enrolled member of the tribe—encouraged the tribe’s hard negotiating tactics, writing to President Rowland, “The Tribal Council has every right and power to request that leases be re-negotiated. Our [BIA] action would be required once negotiations are complete. We are in full agreement with the Council’s request to have Peabody Coal Company become involved in a re-negotiation of the cited leases.” Alonzo T. Spang to Allen Rowland, November 26, 1971 (found in Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-85).


20. Ibid., A-137 to A-139. For further details of Consolidation’s proposal, see chapter 1, above, notes 1–2 and accompanying text. Toole’s quote is found at Toole, Rape of the Great Plains, 49.

Chapter 4. “The Most Important Tribe in America”

Plains: Northwest America, Cattle and Coal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 19–20; and Marjane Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds: Indian Control of Energy Development (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 67–68. As for analyses of the projects’ potential impacts, see Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., “Agony of the Northern Plains,” Audubon 75, no. 4 (July 1973); Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., “Plundered West: Coal Is the Prize,” Washington Post, August 26, 1973; and Lynton R. Hayes, Energy, Economic Growth, and Regionalism in the West (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980), 24. The National Academy of Sciences first articulated the concept of a “national sacrifice area” to meet the nation’s energy needs in their 1974 report, Rehabilitation Potential of Western Coal Lands. Examining the coal industry’s recent trend to locate mines on public and tribal lands in the western United States, this report noted vast difficulties in reclaiming strip mines in arid regions. Concluding that restoration of such lands to their previous ecological state “is not possible anywhere,” the report suggested bluntly that the United States declare certain regions “National Sacrifice Areas,” where reclamation would not even be attempted. James S. Cannon and Mary Jean Haley, Leased and Lost: A Study of Public and Indian Coal Leasing in the West (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1974), 7–8. Two years later, K. Ross Toole first applied the label of “national sacrifice area” to the Northern Plains. Toole, Rape of the Great Plains, 4.

2. Toole, Rape of the Great Plains, 52.

3. The letter is quoted in both Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds, 65; and Josephy, “Agony of the Northern Plains,” 96.

4. This portion of the letter is quoted at Ziontz, Pirtle, Moresset, and Ernstoff, “Petition of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe to Rogers C. B. Morton, Volume II: Appendix,” January 7, 1974, A-144 to A-146, K. Ross Toole Papers, series V, box 28, folder 2, Mansfield Library, University of Montana (hereafter Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition”).


7. Toole, Rape of the Great Plains, 52.


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10. Interview with Marie Brady Sanchez, August 24, 2009, Lame Deer, MT, in author’s possession; National Park Service, “Sand Creek Massacre Project, Volume 1: Site Location Study,” 2000, 268–69, home.nps.gov/sand/parkmgmt/upload/site-location-study_volume-1-2.pdf (accessed December 30, 2014). Allotment came late to the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, and as a result the tribe retained a sizeable portion of their reservation in communal ownership. The 1926 Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act authorized allotment, but tribal rolls were not completed and the reservation was not fully surveyed until the early 1930s. At that time, there were only 1,437 qualified allottees, meaning 234,732.56 acres were apportioned to these individuals in lots of 160 acres or less, leaving 209,791.90 acres in tribal ownership. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act ended the practice of allotment, and subsequent opening of “surplus” land to white settlers, before this additional land could be distributed. Over time, the tribal government reacquired 46,781 allotted acres, giving the tribe 62 percent ownership by the 1970s. Of the remaining 38 percent, much of it had not been granted to the allottees in outright fee, thus the BIA retained trust oversight over this allotted land. See Testimony of Bert W. Kronmiller, Tribal Attorney, “To Grant Minerals, Including Oil, Gas, and Other Natural Deposits, on Certain Lands in the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, Montana, to Certain Indians,” Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, March 28, 1968, 11–12, folder “Northern Cheyenne 14,” box 257, no. 1 (reel 167), Native America: A Primary Record, series 2: Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives, General and Tribal Files, 1851–1983, microfilm collection published by Primary Source Media, filmed from the holdings of the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University (hereafter Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives); Petition of Writ of Certiorari at 8, n. 5, *Northern Cheyenne v. Hollowbreast*, 425 U.S. 649 (1976) (No. 75–145).

11. Interview with Marie Brady Sanchez, August 24, 2009, Lame Deer, MT, in author’s possession.


20. Mining firms with prospecting crews active on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation in fall 1972 included Peabody, Consolidation, Chevron, and AMAX, as well as local speculators Bruce Ennis and Norsworthy & Reger, Inc. As to damages caused by some of these companies, see Ziontz et al., “Northern Cheyenne Petition,” A-131 to A-134 and A-143. For the actual formation of the NCLA, see Bryan, “October Activities of William L. Bryan, Jr.,” 3.


22. Rising Sun’s first quote and Bixby’s response are found at Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal*, 169. For a discussion of generational differences between American Indians’ reactions to the Trail of Broken Treaties, see ibid., at 136–37. Rising Sun’s second quote is ibid., 41–42. For the Northern Cheyenne’s condemnation of the BIA takeover, see Allen Rowland, “Northern Cheyenne Resolution No. 64 (73),” November 14, 1972, John Melcher Papers, series 1, box 115, folder 5, Mansfield Library, University of Montana. Two years after this condemnation, dozens of AIM members returned to the Northern Cheyenne Reservation after the organization’s armed standoff with federal agents at Wounded Knee, South Dakota. AIM members declared that their mission was only to establish a legal aid center and
perhaps organize a Lame Deer chapter, but once again Cheyenne residents harassed the activists. This time, federal agents had to be called in to protect the peace. Jim Crane, “AIM to Aid in Opposing Coal Development,” November 24, 1974 Missoulian (Missoula, MT); “AIM Organizing at Lame Deer,” August 15, 1974, Missoulian; and “Most AIM Backers Leave Lame Deer,” August 25, 1974, Missoulian. Interestingly, the visiting AIM activists camped at the home of Marie and Chuck Sanchez, who participated in the protest at Wounded Knee and then hosted Russell Means, Leonard Peltier, and about thirty other AIM members after the event. Marie Sanchez dismissed the publicity this second visit generated, explaining, “They [local reporters] just wanted to sell papers.” In her recollection, AIM’s presence on the reservation was a non-event and its contribution to the anti-coal cause minimal. Interview with Marie Brady Sanchez, August 24, 2009, Lame Deer, MT, in author’s possession.

23. Results from the Northern Cheyenne Research Project and the tribal members’ quotes are found at Jean Nordstrom et al., The Northern Cheyenne Tribe and Energy Development in Southeastern Montana (Lame Deer, MT: Northern Cheyenne Research Project, 1977), 174–75.

24. Ibid. Woodenlegs’s statement is at “Proceedings of the Native American, Environmentalist, and Agriculturalist Workshop” (Northern Rockies Action Group, December 10, 1975), 14, in author’s possession.

25. Tribal quotes regarding disruptions to the community are found at Nordstrom et al., Northern Cheyenne Tribe and Energy Development, 166, 164, and 161, respectively. For comparison sake, only 9 percent listed environmental impacts as coal mining’s worst possible effect; another 7 percent feared most the loss of land and water that could be used for other industrial development. Rising Sun’s and Sootkis’s quotes come from George Wilson, “Indian Coal Fight Tests U.S. Policies,” Washington Post, June 11, 1973.

26. For years, George Bird Grinnell’s tome provided the primary account of the Northern Cheyenne’s flight from Indian Territory back to Montana. The Fighting Cheyennes (New York: Scribner’s, 1915), 383–411. Recently, James Leiker and Ramon Powers have supplied a much-needed update to this dramatic tale that includes recollections of the event and its contested meaning along the Great Plains. This work is especially instructive for understanding how the Northern Cheyenne’s collective memory of this nineteenth-century ordeal serves to unite the tribe. The Northern Cheyenne Exodus in History and Memory (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), esp. 183–195. Several other books relay the events as remembered by the participants. Edger Beecher Bronson, Reminiscences of a Ranchman (New York: McClure, 1908) 139–97; E. A. Brininstool, Dull Knife: A Cheyenne Napoleon (Hollywood: E. A. Brininstool, 1935); Thomas Marquis, trans., Wooden Leg: A Warrior Who Fought Custer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1957), 321; and John Stands in Timber and Margot Liberty, Cheyenne Memories, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 232–37. Other secondary works dedicate substantial focus to the flight, including Stan Hoig, Perilous Pursuit: The U.S. Cavalry and the Northern Cheyenne (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2002); John H. Monnet, Tell Them We Are Going Home: The Odyssey of the Northern Cheyennes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); Orlan J. Svingen, The


28. The text from Bill Bryan’s pamphlet is found at Michael Wenninger, “$1 Billion Coal Plant Discussed,” Billings Gazette, November 29, 1972; and William L. Bryan, Jr., “Northern Rocky Mountain Environmental Advocate, November Activities of William L. Bryan, Jr.,” November 1972, 2, in author’s possession. Bill Bryan provided the “Coal: Black Death” poster, and it is in the author’s possession.

29. Unfortunately, Toole cites no sources for this meeting between Dahle and Crossland, and subsequent accounts simply cite Toole. Thus it is difficult to verify the meeting took place or assess its impact on tribal leaders. Toole, Rape of the Great Plains, 53–55; and Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds, 65. For the subsequent NCLA meetings and Rowland’s and Spang’s support, see Wenninger, “$1 Billion Coal Plant Discussed”; Michael Wenninger, “Cheyennes Eye Coal Proposal,” Billings Gazette, November 30, 1972; Michael Wenninger, “Indians Mull Coal Referendum,” Billings Gazette, December 1, 1972; and Bryan, “November Activities of William L. Bryan, Jr.”

30. Attendees at this December 7 meeting are detailed in William L. Bryan, Jr., “Northern Rocky Mountain Environmental Advocate, December Activities of William L. Bryan, Jr.,” December 1972, in author’s possession; and Betty Clark to William Byler, December 1972, folder “Northern Cheyenne 16,” box 257, no. 1 (reel 167), Native America: A Primary Record, series 2: Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives, General and Tribal Files, 1851–1983. For NARF’s founding and experience defending southwestern Indians, see Native American Rights Fund, Announcements 1, no. 1 (June 1972), 3–4 and 13. Brecher’s personal involvement

31. Wenninger, “Northern Cheyenne to Fight Coal Complex.”


33. As to Joseph Brecher’s alienating style, see interview with William L. Bryan, Jr., June 13, 2011, Bozeman, MT, in author’s possession. For tribal council efforts to draft tax and reclamation codes, see Franklin, “Indian Tribe in Montana Weighs Major Offer to Strip Mine Coal as Profitable but Perilous.” The resolution canceling all existing coal deals is at Allen Rowland, “Resolution No. 132 (73): A Resolution of the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council Relating to the Cancellation and Termination of All Existing Coal Permits and Leases on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation,” March 5, 1973, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 10:31, Little Bighorn College Archives, Crow Agency, MT.


35. 25 C.F.R. § 177.4(a)(1) (1970); National Environmental Policy Act, Public Law 91–190, § 102, 83 Stat. 853, 854 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006)). In 1972, the comptroller general failed to find documentation of the required “technical examinations” for any Indian mineral leases previously approved by the BIA. United States General Accounting Office, *Administration of Regulations for Surface Exploration, Mining, and Reclamation of Public and Indian Coal Lands* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 13. In response, the BIA took the position that staff need not physically perform the technical examination as long as this requirement could be fulfilled by the “data available in the offices of the USGS and BIA plus the familiarity of the field offices employees with the land.” John Crow to BIA Area Directors, November 17, 1972, Lee Metcalf Papers, General Correspondence, Collection No. 172, box 219, Montana Historical Society, Digital Library and Archives. Only after offering this post hoc rationale did the
Billings area office direct the Northern Cheyenne and Crow reservation superintendents to document how they fulfilled the technical examination requirements for leases and permits already issued. Maurice Babby to Superintendents, Crow and Northern Cheyenne Agencies, December 12, 1972, Lee Metcalf Papers, General Correspondence, Collection No. 172, box 219, folder 219–3, Montana Historical Society, Digital Library and Archives. K. Ross Toole argues this was “a blatant attempt, *ex post facto*, to doctor the files.” Toole, *Rape of the Great Plains*, 59. For the Department of the Interior’s position that NEPA did not apply to agency actions for Indian assets, see United States General Accounting Office, *Administration of Regulations for Surface Exploration, Mining, and Reclamation of Public and Indian Coal Lands*; and Harrison Loesch to John Dingell, November 12, 1971, folder “Natural Resources,” box 147, no. 4 (reel 71), Native America: A Primary Record, series 2: Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives, General and Tribal Files, 1851–1983. In 1975, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, making clear NEPA applied to federal actions managing Indian resources. Further, although no federal court has determined whether compliance with the “technical examination” of 25 C.F.R. part 177 satisfies NEPA’s procedural requirements for an environmental review of any major federal action, the Ninth Circuit held that BIA’s compliance with NEPA’s requirements renders the requirements of part 177 moot. *Davis v. Morton*, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). Ambler’s quote comes from Ambler, *Breaking the Iron Bonds*, 69.


37. Rogers Morton, “Decision on Northern Cheyenne Petition,” June 4, 1974, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 10:31, Little Bighorn College Archives, Crow Agency, MT. Morton actually denied most of the Northern Cheyenne’s claims but did find that the BIA violated acreage limitations placed on the size of mineral leases and that the agency had not yet conducted the proper environmental analyses required by NEPA. On the original question of whether the BIA conducted the proper technical examination, Morton punted, requesting more information on agency actions to fulfill this requirement. The point, however, was moot since Morton already demanded a NEPA-style environmental analysis before mining could


### Chapter 5. Determining the Self


4. Ibid., 6.

5. Crow Coal, Inc.’s proposal is at Joseph Rawlins to Crow Industrial Development Commission, May 10, 1966, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:54, LBC Archives. For background on the company and its formation, see “Articles of Incorporation of Crow Coal, Inc.,” January 7, 1966, Eloise Whitebear Pease

7. For oil and gas activity on the Crow Reservation, see Superintendent, Crow Indian Agency, to Area Director et al., Re: The Ten Year Goals of the Crow Reservation, July 13, 1964, 2–3, 8NN-75-92-206, box 9, folder “Res. Programs—Crow Res.,” National Archives, Denver; and John Cummins and Otto Weaver, “Application to Lease Tribal Lands for Oil and Gas Purposes,” May 17, 1963, 8NS–075–97–341, box 11, folder “Confidential Crow Requests for Oil and Gas Lease Sale,” National Archives, Denver. As of 1967, the Department of the Interior reported the tribe had received only $3,665,000 in mineral revenue since 1920, with 40 percent of this coming over the previous five years. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Granting Minerals, Including Oil and Gas, on Certain Lands in the Crow Reservation, Mont., to Certain Indians, and for Other Purposes*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, S. Rep. 690, 3. The law transferring reservation minerals to the Crow in perpetuity is at *An Act to Grant Minerals, Including Oil and Gas, on Certain Lands in the Crow Indian Reservation, Montana, to Certain Indians, and for other Purposes*, Public Law 90–308, 82 Stat. 123 (1968). In passing this law, Congress thwarted the expectation of individual allottees and surface owners who, under the 1920 Allotment Act, would have received mineral rights at the conclusion of the fifty-year period reserving these rights to the tribe. Despite this sudden change in future ownership, no widespread opposition seems to have materialized on the Crow Reservation. On the neighboring Northern Cheyenne Reservation, however, allottees challenged a similar law passed the same year transferring their minerals to tribal ownership. As discussed in chapter 7, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the law, affirming that all reservation minerals belonged to the Northern Cheyenne, and by implication, the Crow as well. *Northern Cheyenne v. Hollowbreast*, 425 U.S. 649 (1976); see chapter 7, note 6 and accompanying text.


9. The resolution creating the Oil and Gas Committee is at Fred Froze, “Resolution,” November 13, 1952, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:54, LBC Archives. Subsequent clarification of this committee’s powers is found at John Cummins, “Resolution No. 64–09, Resolution of the Crow Tribal Council Granting
Power to the Oil and Gas Committee to Transact Business and for Other Purposes,” July 13, 1963, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:54, LBC Archives; and James Torske to Westmoreland Resources, February 18, 1972, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:54, LBC Archives.

10. For local media coverage of the emerging demand for Crow coal, see “Indians Could Be Big Winners in Coal Boom,” Billings Gazette, September 14, 1967. The resolution conferring unilateral powers to the tribal chairman is at Edison Real Bird, “Resolution No. 68–2: A Resolution of the Crow Tribal Council Authorizing the Crow Tribal Council Chairman to Issue Prospecting Permits and to Grant Mining Leases of Coal Resources of the Crow Tribe of Indians and for Other Purposes,” October 31, 1967, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:20, LBC Archives.

11. Thomas Kleppe, “Decision of the Secretary of the Interior Relating to Crow Tribe v. Kleppe, Et Al.,” January 17, 1977, 1–3, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 14:37, LBC Archives. Peabody’s bonus was $1.00 an acre, Gulf’s was approximately $3.50, and Shell paid $12.00 per acre. These figures are not insignificant, but as we well see, none of the companies ever developed their coal rights and thus never provided a steady, lucrative revenue stream to the Crow tribe.

12. The act transferring Crow land in the Ceded Strip to the federal government is at Act of April 27, 1904, Public Law 58–183, 33 Stat. 352 (1904). Although negotiated in 1899, this transaction was not formalized until several years later, when Congress unilaterally adjusted the payment terms. For the negotiations leading to the land cession and Congress’s alteration of the terms, see Hoxie, Parading through History, 233–39. The act transferring mineral rights back to the Crow is at Act of May 19, 1958, Public Law 85–420, 72 Stat. 121 (1958). For a helpful review of the Ceded Strip’s convoluted history, see Crow Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 657 F. Supp. 573 (D. Mont., 1985), 575–78. To be clear, though the tribe owned mineral rights in the Ceded Strip and the federal government acted as a trustee over these subsurface rights, the surface area was not part of the reservation. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting the opinion in Little Light v. Crist, 649 F.2d 682, 685 [9th Cir. 1981]) that “the ceded area is not a part of the reservation”.

13. For the negotiations between Norsworthy & Reger, the Crow tribe, and the BIA that resulted in an oral auction for Crow coal rights, see Jase Norsworthy to J. O. Jackson, September 5, 1969, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Crow, decimal #323, box 38, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC; Office of Area Director to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 29, 1969, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Crow, decimal #323, box 38, RG 75, National Archives, Denver; A. F. Czarnowsky, Regional Mining Supervisor, to Area Realty Officer, September 30, 1969, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Crow, decimal #323, box 38, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC; and George Hubley, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Area Director, Billings Area, October 20, 1969, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Crow, decimal #323, box 38, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC. To be clear, oral bidding was available only to firms that had first submitted sealed, written bids. Bruce Ennis to Louis R. Bruce, July 17, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Crow, decimal #323, box 38, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC. Recall that the following month, in October 1970, Northern
Cheyenne Tribal President Allen Rowland demanded the same oral auction procedure for his tribe's third, final, and most lucrative coal sale. See chapter 3, note 16 and accompanying text. The results of the Crow's third coal sale are at Bureau of Indian Affairs, “Abstract of Sealed and Oral Bids on Coal Sale #3,” September 16, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Crow, decimal #323, box 38, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC; and BIA Regional Office to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 22, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1958–75, Crow, decimal #323, box 38, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, DC.


Westmoreland Resources,” October 22, 1972, Westmoreland Coal Company Records, Acc. #1765, “Land Questions, 7–73 to 3–75, WR3FEB2,” box 830, Hagley Museum. To be clear, Westmoreland was not the only energy company that elected to transform its prospecting permit into a lease. Shell and AMAX also decided to “go to lease” in summer 1972, but these companies were much further away from beginning actual mining operations. With their prospecting permits set to expire, it appears AMAX and Shell determined to take leases and simply pay the Crow penalties under their contracts’ minimum production requirements in lieu of forfeiting all rights to Crow coal. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, “Coal Mining Lease Indian Lands, Contract No. 14–20–0252,” June 5, 1972, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 17:26, LBC Archives; United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, “Coal Mining Lease Indian Lands, Contract No. 14–20–0252–3865”; and United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, “Coal Mining Lease Indian Lands, Contract No. 14–20–0252–3917,” September 12, 1972, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:66, LBC Archives.

16. Internal Westmoreland correspondence documents this dispute within the tribe over the terms of their deal. According to Westmoreland officials, the BIA was especially wary of approving any lease terms that might contradict the desires of a large portion of the Crow tribe, thus Westmoreland executives expended considerable efforts to demonstrate to the BIA why the amendments to their coal contract were necessary to make their projects viable and that the Crow tribe was fully informed and supported these changes. Minturn Wright to Pemberton Hutchinson, May 4, 1972, Westmoreland Coal Company Records, Acc. #1765, “Sarpy Creek, Land Questions, 8–71–6-73, WE4FEB2,” box 830, Hagley Museum; Minturn Wright to Pemberton Hutchinson, May 8, 1972; and Theodore Voorhees to Louis R. Bruce, May 9, 1972. David Stewart’s new list of demands to Westmoreland are detailed at “Memorandum: Westmoreland Resources,” October 22, 1972, Westmoreland Coal Company Records, Acc. #1765, “Land Questions, 7–73 to 3–75, WR3FEB2,” box 830, Hagley Museum.

17. In Davis v. Morton, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the BIA’s stance that the National Environmental Policy Act did not apply to the issuance of Indian mineral leases. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). Westmoreland communication with BIA officials, who then were tasked with preparing the required environmental analyses, makes clear that the BIA was prepared to delay its report due to Crow dissatisfaction with the current royalty. Theodore Voorhees to Pemberton Hutchinson, March 15, 1973, 2 and 6, Westmoreland Coal Company Records, Acc. #1765, “Legal Correspondence, 1974–76,” box 836, Hagley Museum. As for Crow intervention into the Sierra Club suit, Westmoreland’s payment of attorney’s fees, and Crow demands for advanced royalties, see Charles Brinley, “Westmoreland Resources Meeting Minutes,” September 13, 1973, Westmoreland Coal Company Records, Acc. #1765, “Directors’ Meetings, 1–71 to 9–81, #58.04,” box 831, Hagley Museum; Pemberton Hutchinson to Evalyn Carson, September 21, 1973, Westmoreland Coal Company Records, Acc. #1765, “Sierra Club v. Morton, et al., 9/73–1/76, #350.10,” box 832, Hagley Museum; and Pemberton Hutchinson to Partners, September 21, 1973, Westmoreland Coal Company Records, Acc. #1765, “Sierra Club v. Morton, et al., 9/73–1/76, #350.10,” box 832, Hagley Museum. Hutchinson’s comment about not wanting the Crow to develop Cheyenne


20. David Stewart, “Resolution No. 74–09: A Resolution of the Crow Tribal Council Providing for the Election of a Mineral Committee of the Crow Tribe, Defining the Powers and Duties of Said Mineral Committee, Rescinding and Repealing Any and All Resolutions Heretofore Passed and Adopted by the Crow Tribal Council Which Are in Conflict with the Provisions of This Resolution, and for Other Purposes,” October 13, 1973, 2, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 22c:3:1, LBC Archives. Although the enacting resolution unambiguously charged the Minerals Committee with handling all mineral development, a subsequent resolution gave the committee more specific directions for negotiating with Westmoreland. Tribal attorney Thomas Lynaugh later argued that this subsequent resolution limited the Minerals Committee’s authority to dealing only with the Westmoreland lease. “Resolution No. 74–17: A Resolution of the Crow Tribal Council Authorizing the Mineral Committee of the Crow Tribe to Take Certain Actions, and for Other Purposes,” January 12, 1974, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, LBC Archives; and Thomas Lynaugh to Bud Lozar, November 8, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:19, LBC Archives.

21. Israel’s first meeting with the Mineral Committee is documented in Eloise Pease, “Mineral Committee Meeting [Handwritten] Minutes,” December 4, 1973, 1, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:52, LBC Archives. As to Israel’s coordination with the Crow’s community action program, see Daniel Israel to Ken Toineeta, December 13, 1973, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:57, LBC Archives. In July 1973, the Crow had received a $125,000 grant from the Department of Health,


30. Edmund Littlelight, Jr., to Hardin Herald Editor, December 17, 1975, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 22c:3:1, LBC Archives.


32. Formal protests lodged against the October 1975 Mineral Committee election show that tribal members disputed whether Stands Over Bull properly noticed the special election or instead simply forced through his preferred candidates. “Crow Tribal Response to Protest of the October Quarterly Council Meeting Filed by Robert Howe, Jr.,” October 1975, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 22d:1:2, LBC Archives.

33. In spring 1976, Stands Over Bull was negotiating with at least four different coal companies: Westmoreland, Shell, AMAX, and Gulf. See Keith Doig to Patrick Stands Over Bull, February 12, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 17:26, LBC Archives; Patrick Stands Over Bull to AMAX Coal Company, March 19, 1977; R. B. Crowl to Patrick Stands Over Bull, March 24, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:11, LBC Archives; Patrick Stands Over Bull to Charles Brinley, March 25, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:11, LBC Archives; Keith Doig to Patrick Stands Over Bull, March 29, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:11, LBC Archives; Charles Brinley to Patrick Stands Over Bull, March 30, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:11, LBC Archives; and R. J. Gocken to Patrick Stands Over Bull, March 30, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:11, LBC Archives. For tribal members complaining at the spring council meeting about these on-reservation mining negotiations, see “Public Hearing at Crow Tribal Building,” March 16, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:11, LBC Archives. As for attacks on Stands Over Bull’s coal policy and allegations of public drunkenness, see John Pretty On Top, “So the People May Know!,” May 1976, Joseph Medicine Crow Collection, 4:16, LBC Archives. The four candidates opposed to reservation mining were Sargie Howe, Andy Russell, John Pretty On Top, and Jiggs Yellowtail, the last being Stands Over Bull’s vice chairman. Joseph Medicine


35. For Sonny Yellowtail’s vote against his father, see Constance J. Poten, “Robert Yellowtail, the New Warrior,” *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 39, no. 3 (July 1, 1989): 40.

36. Frederick Hoxie also argues that generational differences greatly influenced Crow positions on reservation allotment during the early twentieth century. According to Hoxie, older, “long hairs” generally opposed the breakup of communal land, while younger, “short hairs” were more comfortable with individual plots and believed allotment to be the only way to preserve Indian land. Hoxie, *Parading through History*, 260–63. Kindness’s quote is found in National Congress of American Indians, *Proceedings from the National Congress of American Indians, Indian Energy Conference, Billings, Montana, August 28–29, 1974*, August 28, 1974, folder “Natural Resources,” box 147, no. 4 (reel 71), 30, Native America: A Primary Record, series 2: Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives, General and Tribal Files, 1851–1983.


39. Lipton’s recommendation to establish a Crow operating company is at Charles Lipton to Patrick Stands Over Bull, October 1, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:8, LBC Archives. The Coal Authority’s enacting resolution is

40. Eloise Pease to Stephen Lozar, October 19, 1976, 3, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 22c:4, LBC Archives; see also Patrick Stands Over Bull to Stephen Lozar, November 12, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:38, LBC Archives. As to the competing bodies negotiating with different mining firms, see Stephen Lozar to Eloise Pease, October 29, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 22c:4:4, LBC Archives; Thomas Lynaugh to Bud Lozar, November 8, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:19, LBC Archives; and Thomas J. Lynaugh to Crow Tribal Officers, Members of Executive and Minerals Committees, December 13, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:44, LBC Archives. Varying accounts of the violent December 22 meeting are found in Phillip White Clay, “Crow Tribal Special Council Meeting Minutes,” December 22, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:43, LBC Archives; Eloise Pease, “Statement of Eloise Pease, Parliamentarian at the Council of December 22, 1976,” Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 14:15, LBC Archives; and Urban Bear Don’t Walk to Ben Reifel, January 24, 1977, 8, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 14:15, LBC Archives. This special council meeting was called after Stands Over Bull’s supporters gathered a petition to create yet another minerals committee to conclude negotiations with Shell. At the December 13 executive council meeting that considered the petition, however, anti-coal opponents countered with their own petition to suspend Stands Over Bull. “Executive Committee Meeting Minutes,” December 13, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 14:15, LBC Archives. As to Stands Over Bull’s actions to adjourn and leave the meeting, see Patrick Stands Over Bull to Stephen Lozar, December 27, 1976, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 22c:4:4, LBC Archives.

41. The BIA order invalidating Stands Over Bull’s suspension is at Patrick Stands Over Bull and Urban J. Bear Don’t Walk v. Billings Area Director, BIA, 6 IBIA 98 (June 6, 1977), 110. In a clear nod to tribal sovereignty, the Board of Indian Appeals held that the question of Stands Over Bull’s suspension was a parliamentary issue that only the tribe could resolve. Because the tribal council never affirmed this action and, in fact, voted down a subsequent suspension resolution on January 8, 1977, the appeals board found the suspension ineffective. The January and April meetings’ minutes are at Phillip White Clay, “Quarterly Crow Tribal Council Meeting Minutes,” January 8, 1977, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 2c:4:4, LBC Archives; and Phillip White Clay, “Crow Tribal Council Minutes, April 9, 1977,” April 9, 1977, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 2c:4:1, LBC Archives. Pease’s quote comes from the January meeting, at 2.

42. Patrick Stands Over Bull and Urban J. Bear Don’t Walk v. Billings Area Director, BIA, 6 IBIA 98 (June 6, 1977), 109.

43. Philip Whiteclay, “Crow Tribal Council Meeting Minutes,” July 9, 1977, 2–4, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 17, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 2c:4:2, LBC Archives. The opposition argued the popular practice of walking “through the line” to support
a resolution pressured individuals to follow clan lines rather than vote their consciences, which was at odds with their conception of sovereignty emanating from the free will of the people.

44. Ibid., 15.

CHAPTER 6. TAKING THE FIGHT NATIONAL


15. Ibid., 10–11.

16. Ibid., 16.

17. Ibid., 128.


and a marked-up copy indicating the changes is attached as a “supplement.” All documents are found in the same location in the archives.

28. Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds, 95–96. CERT initially requested $1 million in federal funds for its resource inventory but received only $200,000. As we will see, the reluctance of the federal government to fully fund CERT’s endeavors pushed the organization to look elsewhere—including to OPEC—for additional support.

29. For Carter’s emphasis on energy policy during his first ninety days in office, see Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 661–64. For MacDonald’s frustration with the lack of federal support and the conflict between FEA and BIA, see Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds, 95; Bill Strabala, “Indian Tribes Seek to Form OPEC-Style Energy Cartel” Denver Post, July 10, 1977; “U.S. Indians Ask OPEC, Third World Nations to Help in Developing Resources,” Washington Post, July 10, 1977; and William Greider, “Indians Organize Own Energy Combine: Patterned after OPEC,” Washington Post, July 17, 1977. According to Ambler, the BIA argued it was already conducting an inventory of Indian resources and that such an action was not within the FEA’s mandate. Ultimately, the FEA would provide $250,000 for this initial resource inventory, and the BIA reluctantly offered an additional $200,000 for establishing an “energy information clearinghouse.” MacDonald’s quotes are at Strabala, “Indian ‘OPEC’ Formed; Navajo Leader Tells Why,” Denver Post, July 10, 1977.


31. Numerous reputable newspapers reported on the CERT-OPEC meetings, though it is unclear whether MacDonald was their only source. Bill Strabala, “Indian Tribes Seek to Form OPEC-Style Energy Cartel” Denver Post, July 10, 1977; “U.S. Indians Asks OPEC, Third World Nations to Help in Developing Resources,” Washington Post, July 10, 1977; William Greider, “Indians Organize Own Energy Combine: Patterned after OPEC,” Washington Post, July 17, 1977; and William Endicott, “Indians Seek Help from OPEC: Ask for Advice on Development of Energy Resources,” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 1977. Winona LaDuke later questioned whether these meetings ever took place or whether rumors of the meetings were spread by MacDonald as part of his grand strategy to gain federal support. Winona LaDuke, “The Council of Energy Resource Tribes,” in Joseph Jorgensen, Native Americans and Energy Development II (Boston: Anthropology Resource Center and Seventh Generation Fund, 1984), 59. MacDonald’s quote on “federal red tape and foot dragging” comes from Endicott, “Indians Seek Help from OPEC.” MacDonald’s insistence on seeking long-range technical help comes from “U.S. Indians Asks OPEC,” Washington Post, July 10, 1977, wherein MacDonald also noted: “We’ve found how (energy) companies have dealt with [OPEC nations]
in the past—bad leases and one-sided operations. We wanted to see if they could give us some technical assistance we can’t get from the United States government.” For MacDonald’s use of anticolonial rhetoric to bolster his support on the Navajo Reservation, see Todd Andrew Needham, “Power Lines: Urban Space, Energy Development and the Making of the Modern Southwest” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2006), 326–30; see also chapter 2, notes 40–41 and accompanying text. MacDonald’s quote to the Navajo Times is at Jim Benally, “Navajos, Arab-Style, to Cash in on Resources,” Navajo Times, March 13, 1974 (quoted in Needham, “Power Lines,” 335).

32. For the public backlash against CERT generally, see Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds, 96–99. For the various causes and impacts of this Second Energy Crisis, see Yergin, Prize, 674–98.


35. Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bonds, 100–101; and Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “$24 Million,” CERT Report 2, no. 5 (March 17, 1980): 3. CERT and others quickly pointed out that not all the $24 million represented new federal commitments and that much of this money was simply redirected from other Indian programs. Still, earmarking these funds specifically for Indian energy development represented a major coup for the energy tribes.


37. CERT’s statement that federal funds would flow directly to tribes is at Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “$24 Million.” For CERT’s shifting tactics to focus on technical assistance, including moving staff to the Denver office, and their success in obtaining funds, see Marjane Ambler, “Uncertainty in CERT,” in Jorgensen, Native Americans and Energy Development II, 71–74. Stone’s quote also comes from ibid., at 74.

38. Even though CERT helped obtain the funding and feasibility studies for several Indian energy projects, many, like the Crow’s synthetic fuel facility, were never constructed. Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “Synfuels Awards,” CERT Report 2, no. 13 (July 18, 1980): 4–5; Dan Jackson and Charlene McGrady, “Mine


**CHAPTER 7. RECOGNIZING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY**

1. For putting the federal grant money to work, see Daniel Israel, “New Opportunities for Energy Development on Indian Reservations,” *Mining Engineering* (June 1980): 652. The 1980 proposed regulations are found at Indian Mineral Development Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 53164 (proposed August 11, 1980) (to be 25 C.F.R. §§ 171.4 and § 182.9), 53166 and 53175. To be clear, these proposed regulations did not include a section on coal mining on Indian lands, as the DOI determined to separate out this mineral for regulation under a separate provision. The agency, however, did not issue proposed new regulations for coal until after the passage of the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act, when the entire regulatory structure was amended to comply with new tribal powers afforded by that act. Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “BIA Indian Minerals Rules,” *CERT Report* 2, no. 14 (August 29, 1980): 1–2; and Mining Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 31978 (proposed July 12, 1983) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 211).  


6. The 1926 Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act reserved to the tribe all “timber, coal or other minerals, including oil, gas, and other natural deposits” found on the reservation, but provided that after fifty years, these resources “shall become the property of the respective allottees or their heirs.” *Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act of June 3, 1926, 44 Stat. 690, 691 (1926).* As to the 1968 law, see Public Law 90–424, 82 Stat. 424 (1968); Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Granting Minerals, Including Oil, Gas and Other Natural Deposits, on Certain*


17. As to Northern Cheyenne advertising for development partners, the response received, and the request for BIA technical assistance, see Allen Rowland to James Badura, February 27, 1980, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC. For the Northern Cheyenne using its own expertise to evaluate these proposals, see Allen Rowland to Members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, December 5, 1980, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC. As to disputes whether the loss of the NCRP left the tribe with adequate expertise to evaluate proposals, see Boggs, “The
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20. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1894, 70–77. At these spring 1982 hearings, Interior officials identified six negotiated agreements that had been approved under various legal theories. These involved energy projects on the Navajo, Jicarilla Apache, Blackfeet, Crow, and Wind River Reservations and included four oil and gas agreements, one coal contract, and one uranium project. Later that fall, however, CERT identified fifteen negotiated agreements between western tribes and energy companies, eight of which the Department of the Interior had approved, and seven that were being held up until Congress clarified tribal authority to negotiate energy contracts. As opposed to Interior’s list of approved contracts, CERT noted that the Crow’s 1980 negotiated coal agreement with Shell Oil was never formally approved. Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “Energy Agreements Affected by Joint Venture Bill.”

21. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1894, 87 and 92; Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “ARCO—N. Cheyenne,” 3; and Ackland, “U.S. Lets Indians Make Their Own Deals.”

22. For Martz’s view on the legality of the Northern Cheyenne-ARCO deal, see Ambler, Breaking Iron Bonds, 87. Ambler actually interviewed Martz shortly after his decision. Hiwalker’s quote is at Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1894, 87. As to the process that produced the legislative solution,
see Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “‘Alternative Agreements’ Bill Passes Both Houses, Awaits Final Actions,” CERT Report 4, no. 11 (September 13, 1982): 17. Although both the Department of the Interior and Senator Melcher drafted their own versions of the proposed legislation, the two sides shared draft bills and worked cooperatively. See Tim Vollman to Ginny Boylan, May 5, 1981, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC; Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1894, 87; and Ambler, Breaking the Iron Bond, 88.


24. The Energy Department’s cuts and MacDonald’s quote are covered in Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “Planned Energy Department Cuts Hit Tribes Hard,” 3. For James Watt’s recent work with the Mountain States Legal Foundation, see Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “Interior Secretary,” CERT Report 2, no. 22 (December 19, 1980): 4–5; and Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “Watt Approved as Interior Secretary,” CERT Report 3, no. 1 (January 23, 1981): 1–2. The case for which Watt filed the amicus brief involved the Jicarilla Apache tribe’s authority to tax oil and gas companies operating on their reservation. In a landmark decision for tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court held that tribal authority to tax “is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management.” Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), 130.


26. Peter MacDonald, “Statement, CERT 1981 Annual Meeting,” October 26, 1981, 4 and 9, folder “Council of Energy Resource Tribes,” box 85, no. 11 (reel 26), Native America: A Primary Record, series 2: Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives, General and Tribal Files, 1851–1983. At this gathering, MacDonald also addressed the recent cuts in federal spending. A staunch Republican, Reagan supporter, and proponent of free market principles, the CERT chairman did not oppose the transition from federal to private support for Indian energy development, but he feared the drastic reduction in federal funding could so damage tribal communities as to shake Indians’ faith in the private sector. Thus, MacDonald tacitly supported some budgetary “belt-tightening,” but he argued for “a little bit of realism, a little bit of political pragmatism with the [free market] ideology that all of us were willing to try out.” “I buy the ideology of the private sector and am prepared to back governmental efforts to apply that ideology,” MacDonald explained, but “there comes a point when the disparity between reality and ideology is so great that people throw out the baby with the bath water.” Ibid., at 4. For other speakers at the CERT annual conference and Halbouty’s quote, see Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “It’s Time the Private Sector Discovered Indian America, Speakers Tell Tribal Leaders at 1981 CERT Annual Meeting,” October 26, 1981, folder “Council of Energy Resource Tribes,” box 85, no. 11 (reel 26), Native America: A Primary Record, series 2: Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives, General and Tribal Files, 1851–1983; and Lynn A. Robbins, “Doing Business with Indian Tribes: The 1981 Annual Meeting of the Council of Energy Resource Tribes,” in Jorgensen, Native Americans and Energy Development II, 52–57.


28. For coverage of the concluding resolutions and MacDonald’s statement, see Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “CERT Board of Directors Calls for an End to Economic Dependence for Indian Tribes,” October 28, 1981, folder “Council of Energy Resource Tribes,” box 85, no. 11 (reel 26), Native America: A Primary Record, series 2: Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives, General and Tribal Files, 1851–1983. NARF’s opinion regarding tribes’ existing authority to enter into alternative contracts is at Richard B. Collins to Council of Energy Resource Tribes, October 13, 1981, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC. The resolution opposing Melcher’s and Interior’s bills is at Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “Resolution No. 81–10, Amendment of the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act,” October 28, 1981, Select Committee on Indian Affairs,
29. In contrast to CERT’s and Melcher’s proposals, Interior proposed a convoluted process for approving alternative contracts. The agency’s bill authorized tribes to negotiate deals, but before they could be approved, the federal government would have to determine whether an agreement conveyed an interest in land. If it did, under Interior’s approach, the old 1938 Leasing Act would determine the deal’s validity. If, however, Interior found the agreement was not a lease—meaning it did not convey a property interest—then the agency would follow the new law’s procedures to determine whether to approve the negotiated contract. Compare Tim Vollman to Ginny Boylan (Interior’s draft) with “Senator Melcher of Montana,” Congressional Record (November 30, 1981): S14127–28 (Melcher’s draft), and Richard B. Collins to Council of Energy Resource Tribes, October 13, 1981 (CERT/NARF’s draft). The Department of Justice’s endorsement is at Robert McConnell to David Stockman, October 20, 1981, 2, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC. For further details of Melcher’s bill, see “Senator Melcher of Montana,” Congressional Record (November 30, 1981): S14127–28; Council of Energy Resource Tribes, “Sen. Melcher Introduces ‘Alternative Agreements’ Bill for Tribal Minerals,” CERT Report 3, no. 16 (December 21, 1981): 1–2; and Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc., “Memorandum No. 81–36, Proposed Tribal Mineral Rights Legislation,” December 30, 1981, folder “Legislative and Administrative Memoranda, 1976–1982,” box 293, no. 1–6 (reel 3), Native America: A Primary Record, series 3: Assn. on American Indian Affairs Archives, Publications, Programs and Organizational Files, 1851–1983.

30. Harrison’s and Burton’s quotes are at Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1894, 34 and 10, respectively. For additional corporate support, see ibid., at 106, 111, and 162.

31. Ibid., 57. For additional opposition to Melcher’s bill based on the fear that uneducated Indians would be taken advantage of, see ibid., 121–36; Paul Frye to Jennie Boylan, May 11, 1982, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC; and Paul Frye to Debby Brokenrope, May 25, 1982, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC. In addition to opposition based on this fear, other detractors of the bill included a minority faction of Northern Cheyenne opposed to all mineral development, an energy company seeking to ensure that federal courts, not tribal judges, retained jurisdiction over disputes arising from alternative contracts, and state officials seeking to clarify their ability to tax mineral proceeds generated by alternative agreements. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1894, 20–26 and 93–103; Terry O’Conner, “Testimony of Terry O’Conner, Director of Legal and Governmental Affairs, Rocky Mountain Division, Peabody Coal Company, on S. 1894,” July 27, 1982, series 6: NCAI Committees and Special Issues, box 238, “Mineral Resources—S. 1894,” NCAI Collection; Chris Farrand to John Melcher, August 27, 1982, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative
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Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC; and Ted Schwinden to John Melcher, June 15, 1982, Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, 1st sess., Bill Files, box 17, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC. Further, the Northern Cheyenne tribal government opposed the retroactive authorization provision as written because they feared it could be interpreted to imply their ARCO agreement was invalid without congressional approval; or alternatively, the new law could preclude the Northern Cheyenne from later challenging certain provisions of its agreement. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1894, 17–19, 86–92; Allen Rowland to John Melcher, March 2, 1982, Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, 1st sess., Bill Files, box 17, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC; and George Hiwalker, “Statement of George Hiwalker, Jr., Vice President, Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council,” July 27, 1982, series 6: NCAI Committees and Special Issues, box 238, “Mineral Resources—S. 1894,” NCAI Collection. For similar reasons, energy companies with previously executed alternative agreements also opposed the proposed retroactive authorization clause. See Mary Anne Sullivan to John Melcher, September 10, 1982, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, National Archives, Washington, DC; and Forest Gerard to William S. Cohen, October 20, 1982, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC. Ultimately, this provision was amended to establish a set of guidelines the Department of the Interior must use to evaluate past deals for approval, rather than simply providing blanket authorization for all existing alternative agreements. Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, S. 1894, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record (December 8, 1982): S14194–96; and Permitting Tribal Agreements to Dispose of Mineral Resources, S. 1894, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (December 10, 1982): H9440–41.


33. Gabriel’s testimony is at Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1894, 84. The Department of the Interior’s letters in support are at Ken Smith to William S. Cohen, March 15, 1982, 2–3, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC; and Roy H. Sampsel to Morris K. Udall, August 9, 1982, 2–3, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 97th Congress, Legislative Files, box 97–2, Records of the United States Senate, RG 46, National Archives, Washington, DC.

34. The difference between the Senate and House versions of the bill related largely to the retroactive authorization of past alternative contracts and did not


EPILOGUE


4. The Shell decision is at R. M. Rice to Crow Coal Commission, 30 1985, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 17:13, Little Bighorn College Archives, Crow Agency, MT (hereafter LBC Archives). Shell officials also noted that the “continuing uncertainty regarding the application of Montana’s severance tax to Crow coal” was another factor inhibiting their ability to proceed. The Supreme Court later clarified that states have the right to impose additional state taxes on Indian resources so long as the tax is not so high as to unfairly damage the marketability of tribal minerals. Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). As to Westmoreland’s release, see C. J. Presley to Forest Horn, March 16, 1981, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 16:49, LBC Archives.


7. For energy firms’ appeal to the Department of the Interior for clarity, see Joan Davenport to John Bookout, November 15, 1977, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, LBC Archives; Joan Davenport to Lowry Blackburn, November 15, 1977, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, LBC Archives; and James Joseph to Cale Crowley, November 15, 1977, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, LBC Archives. Interior’s almost identical response to the energy firms is found at Joan M. Davenport, Department of the Interior acting secretary, to Lowry Blackburn, AMAX Coal Company president, November 15, 1977; Joan M. Davenport, Department of the Interior acting secretary, to John F. Bookout, Shell Oil Company president, November 15, 1977; and Joan M. Davenport, Department of the Interior acting
secretary, to Cale Crowley, attorney for Gulf Oil Corporation and Peabody Coal Company, November 15, 1977, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, LBC Archives. The Westmoreland Company continued its mining on the Ceded Strip but supported efforts to have the Department of Energy restructure the Crow’s apparatus for dealing with energy companies. Charles Brinley to James Joseph, November 17, 1977, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 7b, LBC Archives. In the Crow’s petition to the Energy Department for assistance in amending its government, the tribal attorney actually derided the federal government’s reluctance to get involved with internal tribal politics: “The doctrine and the policy of the Congress is to grant ‘self-determination’ to the Indian people, which quite frankly, is a policy of saying ‘go paddle your own canoe.’ The canoe won’t float with so many holes in it.” Harold G. Stanton, Crow attorney, to James Furse, Department of Energy, November 17, 1977, Eloise Whitebear Pease Collection, 7b, LBC Archives.

8. For the disbandment of the Coal Authority, see Forest Horn, “Resolution No. 80–16: A Resolution Pertaining to Coal Negotiations with Shell Oil Company and to Clarify Which Committee and Entity within the Tribe Has the Authority to Continue Negotiations with the Shell Oil Company,” January 24, 1980, Apsaalooke Nation Council and District Records, Crow Tribal Government Building, Crow Agency, MT. For passage of the 2001 constitution and the new governing structure, see “Takeover Marks Crow ‘New Beginning,’” Billings Gazette, January 11, 2001; and “New Crow Constitution Wins Federal Approval,” Helena Independent Record, December 2, 2001.


10. The Crow Reservation economic figures come from the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, “On Improving Tribal-Corporate Relations in the Mining Sector: A White Paper on Strategies for Both Sides of the Table,” April 2014, 87, available at http://hpaied.org/images/resources/general/miningrelations.pdf. In 2013, the Crow granted Westmoreland another lease for an additional 145 million tons of coal adjacent to the company’s existing mine in the Ceded Strip. Susan Olp, “Crow Tribe Leases 145 Million Tons of Coal,” Billings Gazette, April 11, 2013. In 2008, the Crow announced a partnership with the Australian-American Energy Co. to build a coal-to-liquids plant on the reservation that would extract 38,000 tons of Crow coal per day. Fluctuating global oil prices, however, once again caused that project to be restructured to reduce its scale, and as of February 2013, it is unclear whether the tribe will pursue the liquefaction project. Erica Gies, “Rich in Coal, a Tribe Struggles to Overcome Poverty,” New
York Times, October 25, 2011. In January 2013, the Crow announced an agreement with Cloud Peak Energy that would authorize the Wyoming mining company to excavate 1.4 billion tons of coal from the reservation. This coal, which is more than the United States consumes in a year, is earmarked for export to Asian markets, pending approval and construction of coal export ports in the Pacific Northwest. Sue Olp, “Crow Tribe Signs 1.4B Ton Coal Deal with Cloud Peak Energy,” Billings Gazette, January 24, 2013. Finally, in March 2013, the Crow reached another agreement with Signal Peak Energy to prospect 400 million more tons on the reservation. Associated Press, “Signal Peak Energy Eyes Coal on Crow Reservation,” Billings Gazette, March 19, 2013.


United States Surface Transportation Board, “Section 106 Consultation Meeting for the Tongue River Railroad Construction Project: Transcript of Proceedings,” February 13, 2014, 74-75, available at http://www.tonguerivereis.com/documents/021314_section_106_transcript.pdf. In this meeting, Llevando Fisher discusses the tribe’s 2006 referendum, in which tribal members were asked whether they would rather pursue traditional coal mining or coal bed methane...

16. Passions over the new constitution ran so high that opponents forcibly, though temporarily, took over tribal offices to prevent its implementation. “Takeover Marks Crow ‘New Beginning,’” Billings Gazette, January 11, 2001. To those opposed to reservation mining during the 1970s, the biggest concern with the new constitution was that it stifled public participation, preventing tribal members from raising concerns about energy projects negotiated by their leaders. In fact, members of the opposition group that orchestrated Patrick Stands Over Bull’s 1977 impeachment claim that had the 2001 constitution been in place during the 1970s, the Crow “would be nonexistent now” because their faction would not have been able to “inform the people” of the dangers of development. John Doyle, Urban Bear Don’t Walk, Larry Kindness, Dale Kindness, Dewitt Dillon, interview by the author, August 17, 2009, Crow Agency, MT, in author’s possession.


19. Ibid., 113–16.


22. Ibid., 12–13 (emphasis in original).
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